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Exhibit A 
BEFORE THE STATE OF li'lAH CAK.ithJ:< ~~Rv ILE REVlE\V BOARD 
\V. FRED HURST, HA.ROLD ~1• 
JOHNSON, DANIEL LEATILL\..\1, 
TIMOTHY SLOCUM, and ROBERT E. 
STEELE, 
{:::.riPv~nt..: ~nfl A nneJlanfS. 
v. 
UTAH DEP ARTME~;T OF 
CORRECTIONS. 
Agency and Respondent. 
~~~~~~0~ 
Al'U) 
FT~AT v:yl\TrV .\CTION 
Case ~os. 7 CSRB 65 (Step 6) 
19 CSRB,TI.O. 273 (Si~IJ 5) 
completed.its appellate reYiew of the above-entitled case v-:ith a hearing involving the parties and m1 
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard orJ.l argument at the 
hearing .:md delib2:r:1~..: 2 .:::_ ___ :xec uti·,:: session: DbL: S. Atkin, Chair, Joan 11. Gallegos, m1d 
Felix J. McGowan. .\ i I'll'' 11--'01''11. '" _\pp·'l1 <~-i- n \" ;,.l L-·a~Llllli"l T;nlOtll)' C::locun• ""l'" - J..L ... ~..- ~.....-~ .... 0 - J.. 'I.. .l.....u.. ..... _ - _.___.___ "" .J.. , .l.1. .... - ._,.J.. ......... , .;..u U 
Robert E. Steele (Grievants/Appellants)1 vvere present and represented by Phillip '\Y. =:- ,/ ~~, AtL::r:1ey 
at Law, who presented oral argument on Appellants' behalf. Carey A. Seager, Attorney at Law, was 
..;,1~u present m1d assisted :!'Jr. Dyer at Counsel" stable. Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Steed, 
representc.: ~l:;;; D:.::pJ.:·::~l:::n. ~: -=~~_;_;.;v:iv_;_ls (Deparm1ent and DOC/ vvith Linda V/hitney ili'ld 
--------------
1Messrs. Vl. Fred Hurst and Harold Johnson were not present at this Board hearing. However, they 
are proper parties to this appeal and are specifically referenced whenever the Board refers to "Appellants" 
in this Decision and Final Agency Action. 
2Mr. Steed wrote the Agency's Response to Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the Career Service 
Review Board from the Remand Decision of the Step 5 Hearing Officer (Agency's Response Brief After 
Remand) and presented oral argument on behalf of the Department at the January 21, 2004 Board hearing. 
However, Assistant Attomey General Patrick B. Nolan represented the Department at the "Remand" 
evidentiary hearing held in front of Hearing Officer K. Allan Zabel on December 5, 2002. Mr. Nolan also 
represented the Department during Appellants' initial appeal to the Board of the Hearing Officer's 
October 12, 2001, Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine Including Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Decision 1). This representation included preparing a brief on 
behalf of the Department and presenting oral argument at the initial Board hearing held on August 7, 2002. 
Prior to Mr. Nolan, the Department was represented by Assistant Attomey General Dary·l RP11 a~ well. 
'. r 
I II II ILl :1l 
Lori Worthington present as the Department's management ::.-epresentati-,Ts. 
Al!THORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at§§ 67-19a-101 
through -408 (Su;p 7 C)!JJ.t) (h~reinafter Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act, which is a sub-pan of Lhc "C"tah Stat-.: Pcrsonnd ~lar1agement Act CCSP?vfA) at 
§§ 67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah A.annmsrrrmvo 1 nde at 
Rl.37-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1998). This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Messrs. Hurst, 
Johnson, Leatham, Slu~cun ..:G.l,_: Steele's appeal of the denial of their sala_ry and personnel rule 
violation grievance. Both the Board· s ev1dentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are 
designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-1-18(2)(a). Therefore, those :'-oy:sions of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (CAP A) pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable 
+,- +"h,. f''-'P"l:l.'" '-'+"'::'" ..,,..,d ~tep 6 hearings.(§§ 63-46b et seq.) 
IROCEDLKAL BACKGROUND 
On January 30, :ns, Appellants filed a f,rrie-vance with the Department concerning "on-call 
compensation" and violation of State personnel rules. 3 Appellants' January 30. 1998 "Statement nf 
Grievance" provides specifically as follows: 
Statement of Grievance: 
State of Utah Human Resource lVlanagerm:uL ku~" \;u:y J._;_; -;1 .; .... , 1 ,-<.J.\01\'-J \Yorking 
Conditions, Hours Worked On-r:1ll Time. states: 
''On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available 
for on-call work shall be compensated for on-call time at the rate of 1 hour 
for everv 12 hours the emp]ovee is on-call'' 
Vie have been required by our employer to be on --..::4 nour e~w 
Mr. Bell filed the original Motion to Dismiss and Afotion in Lintin~:: (~vfulion to Dismiss) which were granted 
by the Hearing Officer on October 12, 2001. (Decision 1) Mr. Bell also prepared the Memoranda in 
Opposition to Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration >vhich the Hearing Officer denied on December 26, 
2001. (Decision on Motion for Reconsideration) Finally, Assistant Attorney General David Gardner also 
represented the Department for a brief period oftime during these proceedings. 
3The Board is cognizant of the continued uncertainty as to the specific date Appellants filed their 
grievance in this matter. Therefore, as set forth more fully at pages 13-15 below, the Board fmds that 
Appellants filed their initial grievance with the Department on Friday, January 30, 1998. This fmding is 
made pursuant to CSRB rule Rl37-1-22(4)(a). 
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We have not been receiving 1 hour of compensation for every 12 hours we have been 
required to be "On-call". 
Remedy or Relief Sought: 
We want to be made whole for the lost "On-call" compensation we have not received. 4 
The CSRB received this grievance on Thursday, February 5, 1998.5 
On February 6, 1998, Appellant's received a Level III grievance response from Frederick Van 
Der Veur, Director, Division of Institutional Operations for the Department.6 In his response, 
Mr. Van Der Veur specifically denied Appellants' requested relief and alerted them of the 
opportunity to advance their grievance to the next level of the State's Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq.; CSRB rule R137-1-14)7 The CSRB received 
4At the time Appellants filed this grievance, DHRM rule concerning "on-call" compensation 
provided as follows: 
On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call work 
shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee 
is on-call. 
(i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has freedom of movement 
in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty. 
(ii) Employees record on-call time as "on-call paid" not as "hours worked" on 
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period Any time actually 
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of 15 minutes as "hours 
worked" in addition to on-call time. 
Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i)(ii) 
5Though not specifically specified in the Appellants' "Statement of Grievance," it is clear that 
Appellants seek compensation for "On-call time" for a period offour years preceding the date they filed their 
grievance. (Tr. at 131; Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the Career Service Review Board from the 
Remand to the Step 5 Hearing Officer at 15 (Appellant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal After Remand), Grievants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Agency's Motion to Dismiss and in Limine at 6-7 
(Appellant's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), Decision 1 at 4, Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the 
Career Service Review Board from the Decisions of the Step 5 Hearing Officer at 9, and 9 at n.lO 
(Appellant's Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal), Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decision After 
Remand at 6, 8, n.l (Decision2)) 
6This response dated February 6, 1998, serves as conclusive proof that the Department received 
Appellant's grievance sometime prior to February 6, 1998. 
7Inhis February 6, 1998 response, Mr. VanDer Veur also stated that he was "waiving the level land 
II responses due to the multiple supervisors involved and my belief that this claim should be addressed at the 
Department level." 
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lvfr. VanDer Veur's Level ill response on February 11, 1998.8 
Thereafter, Appellant's appropriately advanced their grievance to the executive director of 
the Department.9 On July 30, 1999, Appellants, through their legal counsel, Mr. Phillip W. Dyer, 
filed a motion to amend their grievance to assert a claim of overtime compensation under 
Article XVI, Section 6, ofthe Utah Constitution. 10 This section of the Utah Constitution provides 
in pertinent part that "eight hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried 
on or aided by the State, County, or Municipal governments .... " In connection with this motion, 
Appellants asserted, through their counsel, that Article XVI, Section 6, entitled them to 
compensation at a rate oftime and one-half (1/2) for any and all work performed in excess of eight 
hours per day. 11 
On February 7, 2000, R. Spencer Robinson (ALJ Robinson), Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department, issued his order denying Grievants' Motion to Amend. 12 In his denial, 
ALJ Robinson reasoned that because "on-call hours" are not hours actually worked nor are they part 
8This Level ill grievance response is part of the file maintained by the CSRB. 
9Though CSRB rule R13 7-1-14 uses the term "steps" to describe a grievance as it progresses through 
the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures, the Department of Corrections commonly refers to these steps 
as "levels". Thus, executive director or department level grievances are referred to as Level IV grievances 
by the Department of Corrections. 
10This motion and the accompanying memorandums of support and opposition to it are also part of 
the file maintained by the CSRB and is specifically referenced in the Department's Final Order dated 
January 19, 2001, and by the Hearing Officer in Decision 1. 
11It is not entirely clear from Appellants' Motion to Amend and the accompanying memoranda how 
Appellants came up with a computation rate of "time and one-half (1/2)" in connection with their Article 
XV1, Section 6, Utah Constitution, claim. The only reference the Board could fmd in the memoranda 
supporting this compensation rate was at page 8 of Appellants 'Reply Memorandum in Further Support of 
Motion to Amend Grievance dated August 20, 1999, wherein Appellants assert that such compensation would 
be "in keeping with the development of modem law .... " 
The Board notes that in Decision 1, the Hearing Officer addressed this issue pursuant to the motions 
filed with him and held that it was "an unacceptable reach" for Appellants to rely on Article XVI, Section 6 
of the Utah Constitution to support their claim for compensation at a rate of one and one-half (112) for all 
times that they were "on-call". Careful review of Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal indicates that 
Appellants are not challenging this specific aspect ofDecision lin their appeal to this Board. 
12ALJ Robinson originally denied Appellants' Motion to Amend on November 3, 1999. However, 
he allowed Appellants to file additional or supplemental memoranda for him to review in reconsideration 
of his order. After reviewing the additional memoranda, ALJ Robins on issued his fmal order on February 7, 
2000. Again, these documents are part of the file maintained by the CSRB. 
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of the work day, Article XVI, Section 6, of the Utah Constitution, did not apply to Grievants' 
requested remedy that they be "made whole for the lost 'on-call' compensation we [they] had not 
received." (Id.) 
On May 9, 2000, an evidentiary Level IV hearing concerning Appellants' grievance was held 
before ALJ Robinson. This hearing was held as part of the Department's internal grievance 
procedure and in consonance with the rules established by the CSRB at R13 7-1-15 and under the 
authority of Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-28. 
On May 22, 2000, ALJ Robinson entered his Report and Recommendation wherein he 
recommended that Appellants be compensated for "on-call time" in accordance with DHRM rule 
R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) which requires an employee to be compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 
1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is on call. 13 However, in his Report and Recommendation, 
ALI Robinson specifically limited Appellants' recovery to "on-call pay for a period of20 days back 
from the date they filed the grievance14 and prospectively from the date of filing, if the evidence 
shows they were 'on-call."'15 
As authorized in Department policy, 16 Appellants then requested that the executive director 
for the Department review the ALI's Report and Recommendation. (Agency Ex. 3)17 On 
January 19, 2001, Executive Director Mike Chabries (Exec. Dir. Chabries) entered his Final Order 
accepting and adopting the findings and conclusions of ALJ Robinson. (Agency Ex. 4) Specifically, 
Exec. Dir. Chabries decided that Appellants were in fact "on-call by virtue of being assigned a 
commute vehicle, or, in Mr. Slocum's case, by virtue ofhis POST order." (Jd.) He then ordered that 
13F or the precise wording of the DHRMrule regarding "on-call" compensation atthe time Appellants 
filed their grievance see footnote 4. 
14In reaching this decision, ALJ Robinson focused primarily on Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) and 
the CSRB decision in Karber v. Utah Dep 't of Corrections, Case No.6 CSRB 57 addressing this statute. 
15 Report and Recommendation, Agency Exhibit 3 ~~ 3, 5 at 4. 
16In accordance with departmental policy, either party may request a meeting with the Executive 
Director to review the ALJ' s Report and Recommendation. This request must be done within five working 
days upon receipt of the Report and Recommendation. If review of the Report and Recommendation is not 
requested within the five working days of receipt, it becomes the fmal order for the Department. 
17It is clear from the documents on file with the CSRB that after ALJ Robinson entered his Report 
and Recommendation, the parties attempted to mediate this matter. These attempts were unsuccessful and 
on January 12, 2001, Mr. Dyer sent a facsimile to ALJ Robinson requesting that the matter be referred to the 
Executive Director for a fmal order. (Agency Ex. 4) 
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Appellants be permitted to submit amended time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the 
date they filed their grievance and then fonvard to include the time Appellants could establish they 
were "on-call." (Id.) In reaching this decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries also limited the compensation 
to be paid to Appellants for any "on-call time" to "1 hour's pay for every 12 hours they were 'on-
call' during that time period." (Id.Y 8 
In his Final Decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries also elected to not exercise discretion to go back 
more than 20 working days from the date the grievance was filed in awarding this "on-call" 
compensation. (I d.) 19 Finally, with respect to Appellants' motion to amend their grievance to include 
claims under Article XVI, Section 6, Utah Constitution, Exec. Dir. Chabries concluded that"' on-call 
time,' since it is not hours worked, is not part of the work day. Therefore, Article XVI, Section 6, 
is not applicable." (ld.) 
On February 5, 2001, Appellants timely filed their appeal of Exec. Dir. Chabries' Final 
Order with the CSRB. 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
In addressing the involved proceedings before the CSRB in connection with this matter, the 
Board makes special note of the numerous motions and memoranda filed in this case. The 
proceedings before the CSRB began when Appellants filed their appeal of the Department's Final 
Order with the CSRB on February 5, 2001. Thereafter, on May 2, 2001, the Department filed its 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine with accompanying memoranda of points and authority in 
support of each with the CSRB.20 
In its motion, the Department moved to dismiss Appellants' grievance primarily on the basis 
that pursuant to Exec. Dir. Chabries' Final Order, Appellants had been granted the remedy they 
18Though Exec. Dir. Chabries does not cite to any specific law or rule in making this determination, 
it is evident that he is referring to DHRM rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) which was cited inALJRobinson's Report 
and Recommendation which requires that an employee who is to be available for "on-call" work shall be 
compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is "on-call". 
(Agency Ex. 3,, 9 at 4-5) 
19 As discussed briefly at footnote 3 above, and more fully at pages 13-15 below, the Board, pursuant 
to CSRB rule R13 7 -1-22( 4 )(a), is correcting the factual findings in this case to find that Appellants filed their 
grievance on January 30, 1998. Both ALJ Robinson and Exec. Dir. Mike Chabries found that Appellants 
filed their grievance on February 11, 1998. (Agency Exs. 3, 4) 
20These motions and memoranda were filed at the prehearing conference held on May 2, 2001, before 
then Administrator Robert N. White. 
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sought "to the full extent of the law." (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6) In 
making this argument, the Department relied primarily on Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) and 
CSRB rule R137-1-2.21 
In its motion to dismiss, the Department essentially argued that absent excusable neglect, any 
claim by Appellants for "on-call" compensation that extended beyond 20 working days from the date 
the grievance was filed was "barred by the statute of limitations imposed on the filing of employee 
grievances." (Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine and Motion to Dismiss at 4 
(Reply for Motion to Dismiss)) The Department argued that since Appellants failed to meet the 
requirements of "excusable neglect," it acted appropriately and lawfully in limiting Appellants' 
recovery of "on-call" compensation to 20 working days from the date Appellants filed their 
grievance. (Reply from Motion to Dismiss at 5) 
In their opposition to the Departments motion to dismiss, Appellants argued that the 20-day 
time limit for filing grievances under Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) governs jurisdiction only and 
does not limit "the scope of their remedy to twenty (20) days prior to the filing of their grievance." 
(Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 7) Instead, Appellants argued that the scope of 
their recovery should include "on-call time" for a period of four years preceding the date on which 
they filed their grievance.22 
Appellants further argued that limiting their eligibility to recover "on-call" compensation to 
the 20 days preceding the date they filed their grievance, violates the "open courts" provision of the 
Utah Constitution. (!d. at 3 n.8) Finally, Appellants argued that the Department's conduct allegedly 
designed to discourage Appellants from requesting "on-call" compensation bars them from asserting 
that Appellants' grievance was "untimely filed." (!d.) 
After considering the Department's motion and the memoranda in support and opposition 
21 Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5) provides as follows: 
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule, 
an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee 
submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the event giving rise to the 
grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee may not submit a grievance more than 
one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
22See footnote 5 at page 3 above. 
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thereto, the Hearing Officer entered his Decision 1 on October 12,2001. In this written decision, 
the Hearing Officer upheld the Department's Final Order concluding that "Grievants have received 
all on-call compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their 
grievance." (Decision 1 at 3) 
Specifically addressing these laws, the Hearing Officer concluded that: "The time limitations 
contained in §67-19a-401(5)(a), Utah Code, constitute a limit on the scope ofreliefthat can be 
granted Grievants . . . The CSRB and its hearing officer do not have jurisdiction to consider 
allegations of improper conduct or knowing violations of statute and policy that were not timely 
grieved." (Id.) 
On October 30, 2001, Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Utah 
Administrative Code R137-1-21(12). On December 26, 2001, the Hearing Officer entered his 
decision denying Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
On January 2, 2002, Appellants timely appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision 1 to the 
Board. In their initial appeal to the Board, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's Decision 1 
on two primary grounds. First, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in sustaining the 
Department's Final Order limiting Appellants' compensation for "on-call time" to the 20 working 
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 5) In 
making this argument, Appellants essentially argue that limiting Appellants' relief to the 20 working 
days preceding the filing of their grievance violates the Open Courts provision contained in the Utah 
Constitution. (Id.at 5-6i3 In connection with this limitation of action argument, Appellants argue 
alternatively that the Hearing Officer erred by not finding that the Department acted "arbitrarily and 
capriciously" in not awarding Appellants' "on-call time" compensation back one year from the filing 
oftheir grievance under Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b).24 (Jd.at 10-11) 
Second, Appellants argue that because an evidentiary hearing was not held prior to the 
Hearing Officer's Decision 1, his decision is more appropriately characterized as an "informal 
23 At page 6 of their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants specifically cite to Article I, 
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution. 
24In their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants do not specifically cite to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) in making this alternative argument. However, it appears clear from this argument and from 
Appellants' reference to the Department's Report and Recommendation, that this is in fact the statute they 
are relying upon for their alternative position that the Department should have awarded back pay for "on-
call" compensation for at least one year preceding the date they filed their grievance. 
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adjudicative proceeding," thereby allowing Appellants "to file a petition with the District Court for 
a trial de novo from the Department's Step 6 decision in this matter." (Jd.at 13)25 
On Wednesday, August 7, 2002, the Board completed its Step 6 review of Respondents' 
initial appeal with a hearing involving all the parties and by meeting in an executive session. On 
October 3, 2002, the Board issued its Order of Remand in this case. This Order was made pursuant 
to CSRB rule R13 7 -1-22(7). 
In its Order of Remand, the Board specifically remanded this case to the Hearing Officer to 
make an "evidentiary determination on the sole issue as to whether there was excusable neglect 
allowing the Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning 'on-
call time'." (Emphasis added) By its Order, the Board specifically left it to the discretion ofthe 
Hearing Officer to determine whether there was excusable neglect sufficient to allow Grievants to 
wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance. In addition, the Board left it to the 
Hearing Officer to decide whether to obtain this evidence through affidavits, stipulated facts, or 
sworn testimony. (Order of Remand) On Thursday, December 5, 2002, the Hearing Officer held an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of "excusable neglect." 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. REMANDED EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND DECISION ON REMAND 
As set forth above, an evidentiary hearing regarding "excusable neglect" was held on 
Thursday, December 5, 2002. At the hearing, Appellants were represented by Phillip W. Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. Appellants Harold W. Johnson, Daniel Leatham, Timothy Slocum and Robert 
Steele were present at the evidentiary hearing. Appellant W. Fred Hurst was not present. The 
Department was represented by Assistant Attorney General Patrick B. Nolan. Assisting Mr. Nolan 
and acting as the Department's management representatives were David Salazar, Human Resource 
Director for the Department, and Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager for the Department. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code 
25 As directly quoted above from their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants refer to the 
"Department's Step 6 Decision in this matter." The Board believes this to be a typographical error and that 
in fact the Appellants are referring to the Hearing Officer's Step 5 decision rendered after motions and 
accompanying memoranda were filed. In reaching this conclusion, the Board cites to Grievants' Initial 
Step 6 Reply Brief wherein they reference CSRB rule R137-1-17 which specifically incorporates Utah Code 
Ann.§ 67-19a-403(2)(b) and Utah Code Ann.§ 63-64b-4. CSRB rule R137-1-17(5) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-15 and 17 allow the State's District Courts to "review by trial de novo all fmal agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings .... " 
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Ann. § 67 -19a-406. Moreover, because Appellants are challenging the Department's denial of salary 
authorized under State personnel rules, they have the burden of proving their case by substantial 
evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(b) and (c)) At the 
remanded evidentiary hearing, the sole issue was whether there was excusable neglect allowing the 
Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning "on-call time." 
(Order of Remand) 
At this evidentiary hearing, testimony was heard and evidence received concerning the issue 
of"excusable neglect." Specifically, there was testimony given and documentary evidence received 
concerning the reasons why Appellants did not file their grievance concerning "on-call time" until 
January or February 1998. In connection with this testimony, there was also testimony given and 
documentary evidence received relating to Appellants' "on-call" status both at the time Appellants 
filed their grievance and for many years preceding the date of that filing. 
At the conclusion of this evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision After Remand (Decision 2) dated January 8, 2003. In 
making this Step 5 decision, the Hearing Officer thoroughly examined the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing and carefully considered the legal arguments raised by the parties. 
After considering the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and examining the 
relevant statutes and rules governing excusable neglect in the filing of employee grievances, the 
Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 decision essentially concluding that Grievants had received all 
the "on-call" compensation to which they were entitled under the statutes and rules applicable to 
their Grievance.26 In connection with this decision, the Hearing Officer specifically concluded that 
"Grievants did not have excusable neglect under Utah Code § 67-19a-401(5)(a) and Utah 
Administrative Code R13 7 -1-13(3) for the late filing of their grievance." (Decision 2 at 6) 
As in Decision 1, the Hearing Officer again concluded that "the CSRB and its Hearing 
26In Decision 2, the Hearing Officer specifically found that "Grievants [Appellants] are entitled to 
on-call compensation for any time they can prove by satisfactory evidence that they served on call beginning 
at a point 20 working days prior to February 5, 1998, and continuing thereafter for as long as they were 
required to be on call." (Jd.at 12) As stated previously, pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(a), the Board 
is correcting this factual fmding to fmd that Appellants filed their grievance on January 3 0, 199 8. The Board 
is, however, sustaining the Hearing Officer's ultimate legal conclusion upholding the Department's Final 
Order that Appellants are entitled to "on-call" compensation only for the 20 working-day period prior to the 
date they filed their grievance for those periods of time that they were in "on-call" status as defmed by 
DHRM rule at the time they filed their grievance. 
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Officer do not have jurisdiction to consider allegations of improper conduct or knowing violations 
of statute and policy that were not timely grieved" and that the time "limitations contained in 
§67 -19a-40 1 (5)( a), Utah Code, are jurisdictional and constitute a limit on the scope of relief that can 
be granted to Grievants." (Decision 2 at 5-6) Finally, the Hearing Officer also concluded that the 
time limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b) is jurisdictional and creates an 
ultimate time limit on the scope of relief that can be granted by State agencies and the CSRB when 
considering grievances. (Id. at 5, 12)27 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In their appeal to the Board of the Hearing Officer's Decision After Remand (Decision 2), 
Appellants appropriately reassert the issues raised in their initial appeal of the Hearing Officer's 
Decision 1.28 Specifically, Appellants reassert that the Hearing Officer erred in sustaining the 
Department's Final Order limiting Appellants' compensation for "on-call time" to the 20 working 
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 5)29 In 
addition, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer's Decision 1 is an "informal adjudicative 
proceeding" thereby mandating that Appellants file a petition with the District Court for a "trial de 
novo" of the Hearing Officer's Decision 1. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 5, 10, 13) 
In addition to these issues already before the Board, Appellants also now appeal several 
aspects of the Hearing Officer's Decision 2. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer 
27In Decision 2, the Hearing Officer set forth five conclusions of law relative to this case. At 
Footnote 2 of Appellants' Reply Brief After Remand, Appellants object to all but one of these conclusions 
of law as being "beyond the scope" of the issues to be addressed on remand. The Board notes, but does not 
share Appellants' concerns on this issue. Careful review of the Hearing Officer's Conclusions ofLaw as set 
forth in Decision 2 reveals that these conclusions are essentially restatements of the Hearing Officer's 
Conclusions of Law as set forth in Decision I relating to the scope of relief to which Appellants are entitled 
and were fully briefed and argued by the parties prior to the remanded hearing. Moreover, because they are 
conclusions of law, the Board will review them giving no deference to the Hearing Officer's decision on 
these legal issues. (Utah Administrative Code Rl37-l-22(4)(c)) 
28Footnote 1 of Appellants' Brief After Remand provides as follows: 
Pursuant to the CSRB 's Order of Remand dated October 3, 2002, and Order limiting 
briefing issues dated July I, 2003, Grievants have limited this Step 6 Brief to the issues 
raised by Decision2. However, the issues previously briefed by the parties are still properly 
before the CSRB for final disposition. 
29In support of this argument, Appellants rely heavily on the Open Courts provision contained in 
Article!, Section 11 ofthe Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-40I(5). 
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erred in concluding that Appellants did not have excusable neglect for the late filing of their 
grievance and thus sustaining the Department's Final Decision limiting their recovery for "on-call 
time" to the 20 working days prior to the date they filed their grievance. 
In addition, Appellants assert that the Hearing Officer erred in deciding "issues oflaw" that 
were not argued or briefed at the remand hearing. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 3) 
Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in addressing the event giving rise to 
Appellants' grievance and applying Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b) in his analysis of this case. 
(Jd. at 3-4, n.6) 
Finally, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in '"revising' his prior finding of fact 
regarding the filing date of the grievance." (ld. at 5-6) These issues will be addressed in the 
remainder of this Decision and Final Agency Action. 
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a)-
( c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual fmdings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual fmdings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual fmdings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
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finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the decisions of the 
Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts 
together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were 
considered by the Hearing Officer. 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. GRIEVENCE FILING DATE 
As set forth above, on May 22, 2000, the Department's ALJ entered his Report and 
Recommendation concerning Appellants' grievance. Pursuant to this Report and Recommendation, 
ALJ Robinson recommended to the Department's executive director, that Appellants be 
compensated for "on-call time" in accordance with DHRM rule which, both then and now, requires 
an employee to be compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee 
is on call. (Agency Ex. 3) In making this recommendation, however, ALJ Robinson specifically 
limited Appellants recovery to "on-call pay for a period of20 days back from the day they filed their 
grievance and prospectively from the date of filing if the evidence shows they were 'on-call."' 
(!d. at 6) In his Report and Recommendation, ALI Robinson specifically found that Appellants filed 
their grievance "on or about February 11, 1998." (Jd.at l) 
On January 19, 2001, Exec. Dir. Chabries issued his Final Order accepting and adopting the 
findings and conclusions of ALJ Robinson. (Agency Ex. 4) Exec. Dir. Chabries then allowed 
Appellants to amend their time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed 
their grievance and then forward to include the time Appellants could establish they were "on-call." 
(ld.) Though only specific as to Appellant Slocum, in his Final Order, Exec. Dir. Chabries 
"accepted" February 11, 1998, as the date Appellants filed their grievance. (Id.) 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5)( a) and the Department's Final Order allowing 
Appellants to amend their time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed 
their grievance, the Hearing Officer- in Decision 1 - concluded that Appellants had "received all 
on-call compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their 
grievance." (Decision 1 at 3) In reaching this decision however, the Hearmg Officer specifically 
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found that Appellants had filed their original grievance on January 30, 1998.30 (Id. at 1) 
In Decision 2, however, the Hearing Officer revised this finding of fact to find that: "The 
Hearing Officer must conclude that the date a copy was received in the office of the CSRB, 
February 5, 1998, is the proper date of the grievance." (Decision 2 at 12Y1 After making this finding 
of fact, the Hearing Officer then concluded that Appellants' recovery on their grievance was limited 
by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(a) to a period of20 working days "prior to February 5, 1998, 
and continuing thereafter as long as they were required to be on-call." (Id.) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board is correcting the Hearing Officer's 
Decision 2, finding of fact regarding when Appellants filed their initial grievance. The Board is 
taking this action pursuant to CSRB R13 7 -1-22( 4 )(a). In reaching this decision, the Board notes that 
although the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(5) limits the scope of relief to which Appellants are entitled to the 20 working-day 
period prior to the date they filed their grievance, it does not believe the evidentiary record supports 
the Hearing Officer's Decision 2 fmding that Appellants filed their grievance on February 5, 1998. 
In reaching this decision, the Board notes that the Department, in both its Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion in Limine, states that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. In addition, 
in the Department's Initial Brief on Appeal dated June 14, 2002, the Department again acknowledges 
that Appellant's filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998. 
Moreover, the grievance itself, is signed by Appellants on January 30, 1998. The file 
maintained by the CSRB also establishes that the Department's Level III response is dated 
February 6, 1998. Finally, the record clearly establishes that Appellants' grievance datedJanuary30, 
1998, was received at the office of the CSRB on February 5, 1998. Based upon this evidence, the 
Board concludes that the grievance was clearly filed with the Department prior to February 5, 1998. 
30The Board notes that in its statement of facts set forth in its Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss, the Department asserts that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. However, in 
its Reply to Motion to Dismiss, the Department alternatively asserts that Appellants filed their grievance on 
February 11, 1998. (Reply to Motion to Dismiss at 2) Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss is silent 
relative to the issue of when Appellants filed their grievance, but importantly, does not object to any of the 
Statements of Facts set forth in the Department's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, including 
the Department's statement of fact that the Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. 
31The Hearing Officer reached this fmding notwithstanding assurances made at the evidentiary 
hearing that he would not alter his original fmding of fact that January 30, 1998, was the date Appellants 
filed their grievance. Specifically addressing this issue at the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer stated 
" .. .I am going to stand on the original fmding of fact which I made of January 30, 1998." (Tr. at 24) 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Board is correcting the Hearing Officer's Decision 2, to fmd 
that Appellants filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998. This decision is supported by the 
memoranda and briefs submitted in this case and is consistent with the Hearing Officer's fmding of 
fact set forth in Decision 1. In reaching this decision, the Board also notes that despite Appellants' 
challenge to this fmding, the Department presented no argument in it's Response Brief After Remand 
to support the Hearing Officer's Decision 2 finding that Appellants filed their initial grievance on 
February 5, 1998. Based upon these facts, the Board corrects the record to indicate that Appellants 
filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998. 
B. TIME LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES 
As set forth at footnote 21 above, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (5) provides as follows: 
( 5)( a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule, 
an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee 
submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the event giving rise to the 
grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (S)(a), an employee may not submit a grievance more than 
one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
In both Appellants' Opposition to the Department's Motion to Dismiss and their Initial Step 6 
Brief on Appeal, Appellants argue that as a matter oflaw Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5) governs 
only jurisdiction and does not limit the scope of recovery available to Appellants. Appellants 
essentially argue that because Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) does not limit the scope of recovery 
available, they are entitled to recover "on-call" compensation for a period of four years preceding 
the date they filed their grievance. (Tr. at 131 )32 
In support of this argument, Appellants assert that the statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(5) regarding the time frames in which an employee may submit a grievance are 
discretionary in nature and that by in enacting this statute, the Legislature "did not create a, per se 
statute of limitations." (Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 6-7) In making this 
argument, Appellants concluded that: 
32See footnote 5 above. 
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While U.C.A. § 67-19a-401(5) may effectively operate to preclude the CSRB from 
exercising jurisdiction in some circumstances, the Legislature did not impose a blanket 
prohibition on the filing of a grievance because of the obvious potential for the same to be 
held an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. 
(Id. at 7) 
In Decision I, the Hearing Officer granted the Department's motions. In his Decision I, the 
Hearing Officer agreed with the Department that the time limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5)( a) are jurisdictional and specifically limit the scope of relief available to Appellants 
to the 20-day period prior to the date they filed their grievance. (Decision I at 6) Based upon this 
legal conclusion and the Department's Final Order permitting Appellants to submit amended time 
sheets listing their "on-call time" for the 20 working-day period prior to the date they filed their 
grievance, the Hearing Officer held that "Grievants [Appellants] had received all on-call 
compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their grievance." 
(ld. at 3) 
In their appeal to this Board, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that 
Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) limits the scope of relief available to Appellants to the 20 working 
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Brief on Appeal at 5) Specifically 
addressing this issue, Appellants argue that ''the Hearing Officer has unconstitutionally applied the 
twenty (20) day 'statute of limitations' to Grievants because such statute is unreasonable and 
therefore, unconstitutional ... "and that such a fmding "results in an unconstitutional application 
of the Open Court's clause" of the Utah Constitution. (Initial Brief on Appeal at 7; citing Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)). 
After carefully reviewing the Hearing Officer's decisions in this matter and considering the 
parties' arguments, the Board upholds and thus sustains the Hearing Officer's decisions on this issue. 
In reaching this decision, the Board finds that Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) clearly establishes 
mandatory time frames regarding when an employee may submit a grievance under the State's 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-101 et seq. 
This statute plainly requires that, absent excusable neglect, an employee must submit their 
grievance for review either within 20 working days of the event giving rise to the grievance or within 
20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the event giving rise to the grievance. (Utah 
Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5)( a)) (Emphasis added) Moreover, this section further jurisdictionally bars 
consideration of any grievable event occurring "more than one year after the event giving rise to the 
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grievance." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b)) (Emphasis added) 
The Board finds that the language of this statute allows for no discretion as to when an 
employee may submit their grievance. These limitation periods are mandatory and jurisdictionally 
bar consideration of any grievences not filed within the specified time frames. 33 
In addition, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decisions that absent excusable neglect, 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5), limit the scope of relief that can be granted to 
a grievant to the 20 working-day period immediately preceding the date the grievance is filed. In 
reaching this decision, the Board relies on the plain language of the statute and its prior decision in 
Karber v. Utah Dep 't of Corrections, 6 CSRB 57 (1997). 
In Karber, the Board considered the scope of relief available to an employee seeking recovery 
of"excess hours" for a period oftime extending back approximately one and one-half years. In its 
decision in Karber, this Board ruled that the scope of relief available to Karber was limited to the 
20-day period immediately prior to the date he filed his grievance. The Board further reasoned that 
Karber's grievance was untimely filed as to any period of time predating that 20-day period. (Id.at 
9, 13) 
By this decision, the Board reaffirms and upholds its prior decision in Karber. Both the 
department and the CSRB are limited in the scope of relief they can grant to the 20-day time period 
immediately preceding the date a grievance is filed. In interpreting the statute in this way, the Board 
is treating Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 (5) no different from other statutes of limitation. As with 
all limitations on action, an aggrieved individual may either comply with the time limits imposed 
by the statute and thus secure the opportunity for redress, or ignore the time limitations and be 
precluded from any available remedy. The Board simply has no jurisdiction over grievable events 
that are not timely grieved. 
C. fHE EVENT GIVING RISE TO THE GRIEVANCE 
In the instant case, there is little factual dispute that Appellants were in "on-call" status, and 
thus entitled to "on-call" compensation as allowed by DHRM rule R477-8-6(c)(i)/4 on numerous 
33For a discussion regarding this ruling and the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution, see 
page 27 below. 
34As set forth in footnote 4 above, this rule requires that employees in "on-call" status be 
compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is "on-call." The Board 
recognizes that this Rule has been amended since Appellants filed their grievance. For the precise wording 
of this Rule at the time Appellants filed their Grievance, see footnote 4 above. 
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occasions and for many years prior to the date they filed their grievance. (Decision 2 at 8 and at 
8 n.l; Tr. at 129, 153; Agency Ex. 3at 2; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss~~ 6-9 
at 3-4)35 Indeed, Appellant Leatham testified that he had a cell phone and a commute vehicle 
beginning in either 1987 or 1988. (Tr. at 129) He further testified that he had a pager for a longer 
period of time than that. (Id.) Likewise, Appellant Steele testified that he had been assigned a 
commute vehicle and was required to carry a cell phone and a pager for approximately 20 years. (!d. 
at 153)36 
Taking all these factors into considerations, the Board concludes that a new grievable event 
occurred in this case each time the State failed to pay Appellants any "on-call" compensation to 
which they were entitled. Precisely for this reason, the Board does not believe that any singular 
"event" gave rise to the Appellant's grievance in this case. Instead, the Board finds, similar to its 
decision in Karber, that each separate pay day in which Appellants were entitled to "on-call" 
compensation, but did not receive it, became a new grievable "event" subject to a new 20-day 
grievance period under Utah Code Ann. § 69-19a-401(5). 
In the instant case, this Board has already corrected the Hearing Officer's factual 
determination to find that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998.37 Therefore, absent 
excusable neglect, this Board is jurisdictionally limited to the relief it can grant to the 20 working-
day period immediately preceding the date Appellants filed their grievance. By so fmding, the Board 
affirms that it does not have jurisdiction over grievable events that are not timely grieved under the 
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
D. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
35 As the Hearing Officer correctly found, Appellants seek a remedy going back four years from the 
date they filed their grievance which would relate their grievance back to January 1994. (Tr. at 131) The 
facts of this case establish that Appellants were in "on-call" status for at least the four years prior to filing 
their grievance. 
36Mr. Johnson testified similarly, but did not specifically mention what year he was assigned a 
commute vehicle or when he was first required to carry a pager and cell phone. (Jd. at 146) Appellant 
Slocum turned in his commute vehicle in February 1996, but was in "on-call" status after that pursuant to 
his POST order requiring him to "carry a pager and respond to service upon activation during day or night." 
(Agency Ex. 3 ~ 8 at 2) 
37Though thoroughly addressed above, the Board notes that nowhere in either their Initial Step 6 
Brief on Appeal or their Brief on Appeal After Remand do Appellants argue for an earlier grievance filing 
date than January 30, 1998. 
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Having already determined that the "event" giving rise to Appellants' grievance occurred 
each pay period the Department failed to pay "on-call" compensation to which Appellants were 
entitled, the Board must now determine whether Appellants' neglect in waiting until January 30, 
1998, to file their grievance is "excusable." Before addressing Appellants' actions in waiting until 
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance, the Board will first briefly address Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(5)(b) that provides: "Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a) [excusable neglect], an 
employee may not submit a grievance more than one year after the even giving rise to the grievance." 
As stated previously, one of the Board's obligations on appeal is to review the hearing 
officer's decision to determine whether relevant policies, rules and statutes were correctly applied. 
In making this legal determination, the Board gives no deference to the hearing officer's decision. 
(CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(b)) In his Decision 2, the Hearing Officer specifically found that Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b) jurisdictionally bars both the Department and the CSRB from 
considering an employee grievance submitted more that one year after the "event giving rise to the 
grievance," even in situations where excusable neglect is an issue. (Id.at 6) The Board agrees with 
the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue. 
Moreover, the Board does not find, as Appellants argue, that the Hearing Officer's ruling 
on this issue in Decision 2 went beyond the scope of the issue remanded to him.38 The Board's 
Order of Remand dated October 3, 2002, ordered that an evidentiary determination be made by the 
Hearing Officer "as to whether there is excusable neglect allowing Grievants to wait until January 
or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning on-call time." (Emphasis added)39 
In making his legal conclusion concerning excusable neglect, the Hearing Officer was simply 
emphasizing that even if he "found that Grievants had excusable neglect for the delay in filing their 
grievance," such neglect would not allow the filing of their grievance more than one year from the 
38Regardingthis legal issue, Appellants argue: "In Decision 2, the H.O. spends much time addressing 
the following issues: ... 2) does any grievant's excusable neglect toll the one (1) year statute of 
limitation/repose contained in U.C.A. 67-19[a]-401(5)(b) (1999)? Obviously, Grievants' counsel was not 
given advance notice by the H.O. that he believed ... the foregoing issues were encompassed within the 
CSRB's Remand Order." (Brief on Appeal After Remand at 3-4, n.6) 
39In their appeal to this Board, Appellants maintain that because an evidentiary hearing was not held 
prior to the Hearing Officer's Decision 1, his decision should have been characterized as an "informal 
adjudicative proceeding" allowing Appellants to "file a petition with the District Court for a trial de 
novo .... " Based upon the remanded evidentiary hearing held in this matter on December 5, 2002, the Board 
now considers this argument moot. 
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date of the "event" giving rise to their grievance. (Decision 2 at 6) 
The Board finds no error by the Hearing Officer in addressing this legal issue in Decision 2 
and upholds his legal conclusion on this matter. Specifically, the Board fmds that the statute setting 
forth the time frames in which an employee may submit a grievance are mandatory and under no 
circumstances may a grievance be submitted more that one year after the "event" giving rise to the 
grievance. Based upon this statute, the Board finds that both the Board and its hearing officers are 
jurisdictionally limited in the scope ofreliefthey can grant by Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5). 
Having thoroughly addressed the jurisdictional limitations cabined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(5), the Board will now address excusable neglect as it specifically relates to 
Appellants' case. After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, the Board notes that 
Appellants have essentially advanced two discordant reasons for waiting until January 30, 1998, to 
file their grievance.40 
First, Appellants assert that they were not aware of their entitlement to "on-call" 
compensation until January 1998. (Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, ~6 at 5) In 
connection with this argument, Appellants argue that they were mislead by the Department regarding 
their entitlement to "on-call" compensation and filed their grievance shortly after concluding that 
theywereinfactentitledto such compensation. (!d.; Tr. at 115,117,127,132-133,140,150, 157; 
Decision 2 ~ 20 at 5) 
Conversely, Appellants assert that they had a reasonable fear of retaliation by the Department 
that prevented them from filing their grievance in a timely manner. Appellants argue that this fear 
was ongoing creating a legal basis for waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. 
(Tr. 121-122,141-144, 159-162; Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 14-21; Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss at 8) 
40The Board finds troubling the inherent inconsistency of the reasons advanced by Appellants for 
waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. This concern is based primarily on the Board's view 
that Appellants cannot simultaneously assert "they were not aware they could claim on-call time until shortly 
before they filed the grievance" and simultaneously argue that, but for their fear of retaliation by the 
Department, they would have filed their grievance sooner. (Compare Appellants' Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss at ~6 at 5 and Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 22 withAppellants 'Brief on Appeal After 
Remand at 13-20) The Board fmds these inconsistencies to exist even if- as Appellants claim- they were 
misled by the Department regarding their entitlement to such compensation. Lack of knowledge, regardless 
of the reason, is simply inconsistent with their argument that absent fear of retaliation they would have filed 
their grievance sooner. This later argument necessarily embodies knowledge of their entitlement to such 
compensation. 
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Prior to addressing these specific reasons advanced by Appellants for waiting until 
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance, the Board will briefly address the statutes and rules 
regarding "excusable neglect." The Board notes in its review of the statutes and rules concerning 
"excusable neglect," that the specific statute setting forth the time frames in which an employee must 
file a grievance does not defme the term "excusable neglect." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)) 
Indeed, the specific language of this statute states that: "Unless the employee meets the requirements 
of excusable neglect established by rule ... " (Emphasis added) Based upon the plain language of 
this statute, it is clear that the Legislature gave to the CSRB the authority to promulgate rules 
defming "excusable neglect." (I d.) 
CSRB rules regarding "excusable neglect" provide that: 
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably 
prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at the proper 
time, not in consequence of the person's own carelessness, inattention, or 
willful disregard in the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of 
some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. 
(CSRB rule Rl37-1-2) 
The only other rule touching upon "excusable neglect" can be found at CSRB rule 
R137-l-13(3)(a) which provides as follows: 
(a) the administrator or appointed CSRB hearing officer shall 
determine the applicability of the excusable neglect standard on the 
basis of good cause. 
Using our rules as the foundation, the Board will now consider whether the reasons advanced 
by Appellants for waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance constitute "excusable 
neglect." Before doing so however, the Board notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer that 
"excusable neglect cases are 'highly fact intensive.'" (Citing West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1997)) Moreover, the Board notes that factfinders are given broad discretion in making 
excusable neglect determinations. (Jd.) The Board also agrees with the Hearing Officer concerning 
the scope and applicability of the Board's defmition of "excusable neglect." This definition 
incorporates the provisions of CSRB rule Rl3 7-1-13 (3 )(a) in that "excusable neglect" contemplates 
an "unexpected or unavoidable hindrance" for not filing a grievance timely. The Board believes an 
unexpected or unavoidable hindrance normally involves circumstances that are essentially beyond 
a person's control which equates to "good cause." See Riesbeckv. HCA Health Services of Utah 2 
P.3d 447 (Utah 2000) 
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Addressing first Appellants's contention that they "were not aware of their entitlement to 
on-call compensation pursuant to DHRM rule R477-8-6(a)(c)(i) until January of 1998," the Board 
notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants "lack of awareness oftheir 
legal rights vis-a-vis the on-call time is not the same as lack of knowledge of the on-call time itself." 
(Decision 1 at 8) As previously discussed, Appellants knew they were in "on-call" status for at least 
four years prior to the filing of their grievance. (Decision 2 at 8, 8 n.l; Tr. at 129, 146, 153; Agency 
Ex. 3 ~~ 8-9 at 2) Appellants also knew that they were not being compensated for being in "on-call" 
status. 
Addressing the issue of what triggers the running of a period oflimitations, the Utah Court 
of Appeals held in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) that it is 
the event, not the discovery of a legal theory on which one may make a claim, that triggers the 
running of a period of limitations. (Jd.at 576) In the instant case, the event triggering the running 
of the limitation period occurred each separate pay period in which Appellants' were entitled to "on-
call" compensation, but did not receive it. Appellants alleged lack of knowledge concerning their 
entitlement to "on-call" compensation under DHRM rule simply does not stop the running of the 
limitation periods set forth in Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-401(5). This statute clearly and 
unambiguously requires that absent excusable neglect, employees must file their grievance within 
I 
20 working days of the "event" giving rise to the grievance or within 20 working days after the 
employee has knowledge of such "event." 
The Board reaches this decision while recognizing that Appellants assert that the Department 
engaged in misleading conduct allegedly impairing Appellants' ability to ascertain their entitlement 
to "on-call" compensation while in "on-call" status. In support of this argument, Appellants rely 
primarily on the fact that, prior to July 1997, the Department told Appellants not to submit time 
sheets because they were exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and thus 
not entitled to any compensation beyond their regular salary. (Tr. at 136; Agency Ex. 3 ~ 2 at 1; 
Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at ~ 1 at 4; Appellants' Reply Brief After Remand at 6 
n.8) Appellants further argue that this "misleading conduct" continued even after July 1997, when 
the Department "all of a sudden" switched their position and had Appellants fill out time sheets, but 
limited the compensation Appellants received for being in "on-call" status to those times that they 
were the Officer in Charge (OIC). (Tr. 130, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
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The Board does not believe these factors are sufficient to constitute an unavoidable hindrance 
allowing Appellants to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. In support of this 
position, the Board notes that the DHRM rule regarding "on-call" compensation was readily 
available, not only to Appellants, but to all public employees at all times relevant to this matter. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that in July 1997, when the new Executive Director for the Department 
took over, Appellants were again required to submit time sheets and began receiving "on-call" 
compensation for those periods of time they were "on-call" as the OIC. (Tr. at 130, 136; Agency 
Ex. 3 ~ 2 at 1; Appellants Reply Brief After Remand at 6-7) 
In the instant case, the Board simply does not find, to the extent that Appellants argue such, 
that their lack of knowledge of entitlement to "on-call" compensation constitutes excusable neglect 
enabling them to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. As stated previously regarding 
this issue, lack of knowledge of an "event" tolls the limitation periods for filing grievances; failure 
to recognize that an "event" is grievable does not. Based upon the foregoing, the Board upholds the 
Hearing Officer's decisions on this issue. 
Appellants second contention for waiting untilJ anuary 30, 1998, to file their grievance is that 
their fear of retaliation by the Department prevented them from filing their grievance in a more 
timely manner and that this fear was sufficient to constitute "excusable neglect" under CSRB rules. 
(Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 14-20) After conducting an evidentiary hearing on 
the remanded issue of "excusable neglect," the Hearing Officer issued his Decision 2 on January 8, 
2003. In this decision, the Hearing Officer examined whether the Appellants' alleged fear of 
retaliation for filing a grievance was sufficient to constitute "excusable neglect" under CSRB rules. 
Specifically addressing this issue, the Hearing Officer concluded that Appellants' "fear of 
retaliation prior to July 1997, was sufficient on the facts of this case to constitute unavoidable 
hindrance, and imbued Grievants failure to file a timely grievance with excusable neglect for 
purposes of§ 67-19[a]-401(5)(a). (Decision 2 at 10) However, in reaching this decision, the 
Hearing Officer specifically limited his fmding of "excusable neglect" to the time period prior to 
July 1997, when Mr. Pete Haun (Exec. Dir. Haun) became the executive director of the Department. 
In reaching his decision that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" after July 1997, the 
41See footnote 30 at 14 above. 
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Hearing Officer in his Decision 2 focused on the significant efforts made by Exec. Dir. Haun to 
create an atmosphere where employees of the Department would feel free to file grievances and deal 
with concerns in an environment free of retaliation or reprisal. The efforts emphasized by the 
Hearing Officer included Exec. Dir. Haun's numerous visits to the Department's facilities and his 
use of the Department's in-house newsletter to let employees know ofhis desire to improve working 
conditions within the agency and specifically let employees know that there would be no retaliation 
for filing grievances. In specific relation to Appellants, the Hearing Officer focused on 
Exec. Dir. Haun' s request that Appellants and others submit time sheets for the hours they worked 
and starting in July 1997 compensated Appellants for the period of time they were in "on-call" status 
as OICs. (Decision 2 , 11 at 4, 10-11) 
In reviewing the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue, the Board must first determine 
whether the Hearing Officer's factual fmdings are supported by the evidentiary record. (Utah Admin. 
Code R137-1-22(4)(a)) In making such a determination, this Board has consistently held that the 
findings of the fact finder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. (Jones v. Utah Dep 't of 
Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38 (Step 6) (1992); See also Pace v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 7 CSRB 
64 at 15-16 (Step6) (2002); Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at 7-8 (1986).) 
In the instant case, the Hearing Officer heard testimony from Appellants Leatham, Johnson, 
Steele and Slocum. He also heard testimony from then Exec. Dir. Haun, ALJ R. Spencer Robinson 
and others. The Hearing Officer was in the best position to hear this testimony, weigh the evidence 
given, and judge the veracity of the witnesses' statements. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing in this matter, the Hearing Officer entered his final decision concluding that Appellants did 
not have "excusable neglect" to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. In reaching this 
decision, the Hearing Officer essentially concluded that Appellants' alleged fear of retaliation after 
July 1997 was not reasonable and that there was an "inherent inconsistency" in Appellants claim that 
they "continued to fear possible retaliation after July 1997, while simultaneously reporting on-call 
time for which they were compensated." (Id.at 1lt2 
42The Board does not agree with Appellants that "it [the Board] is in as good a position as the 
Hearing Officer to determine the challenged fmding of fact based on the transcript and exhibits," or that it 
"should review the fmding of fact ne novo." (Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 9) Careful 
review of his decision clearly indicates that the Hearing Officer considered all the evidence and weighed the 
credibility of the witnesses before entering his decision. Indeed, the Hearing Officer specifically references 
the conflicting testimony which Appellants assert he did not address in his Decision 2. (Decision 2 at 1 0-12) 
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After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, including the sworn testimony of the 
witnesses and the documents entered into evidence, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's 
conclusion that Appellants did not have "excusable neglect," based upon concerns of retaliation, for 
waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. 
In reaching this decision, the Board cites to the evidentiary record which establishes that 
immediate I y after taking office, Exec. Dir. Haun visited every region and every departmental facility 
and spoke with "hundreds and hundreds" of the Department's employees informing them of his 
open-door policy and his desire to improve working conditions within the Department. (Tr. at 174, 
181, 205) In connection with these meetings, Exec. Dir. Haun emphasized that employees should 
feel free to file grievances and deal with employment concerns in an environment free of retaliation 
or reprisal and that his intent was to do a complete revision of the staff discipline and grievance 
procedures including a recision of the general order prohibiting the ALJ from hearing employee 
grievances. (Tr. at 183; Agency Ex. 3 ~15 at 3, Agency Ex. 5;Appellants' Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss~ 5 at 5) The evidence also establishes that Exec. Dir. Haun used the Department's in-house 
newsletter to inform employees of his intent to revise the Department's discipline and grievance 
procedure and even requested input from the employees on such revisions. (Tr. at 17 5, 182; Agency 
Ex. 5) 
The record also establishes that after Mr. Haun because Executive Director for the 
Department in July 1997, Appellants began submitting time sheets and were compensated variously 
for the time they were in "on-call'' status as OICs. (Agency Ex. 3 ~2 at 1; Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss~ 2 at 2, Appellants' Reply Brief After Remand at 6)43 Moreover, the facts of 
this case establish that shortly after Mr. Haun became Executive Director of the Department, 
Appellant Leatham met with him to discuss individual issues unrelated to this grievance. (Tr. at 123, 
132-133) Indeed, when testifying concerning his initial meeting with then Exec. Dir. Haun, 
Appellant Leatham specifically testified that if he had known he was eligible for "on-call" 
compensation, he would have brought it up with Exec. Dir. Haun during this initial meeting. (Jd. 
at 132-133) 
43 Agency Exhibit 3, which was admitted into evidence without objection and as part of the record, 
establishes that beginning with pay period 13 of 1997, Appellants' Leatham and Steele submitted time sheets 
listing "on-call" hours. Appellants' Johnson and Hearst began submitting time sheets in pay period 14 of 
1997. The hearing transcript on page 158 indicates that Appellant Slocum first submitted his time sheet 
listing "on-call" hours in December of 1997. These facts are not disputed anywhere in the evidentiary record. 
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Based upon these factors, the Board fmds that in reaching his conclusion that after Mr. Haun 
became Executive Director, Appellants did not have "excusable neglect" to wait until January 30, 
1998, to file their grievance, the Hearing Officer did not abuse the broad discretion granted to him 
to make this determination. His decision is reasonable and rational and supported by the evidentiary 
record. Moreover, the Hearing Officer clearly weighed and considered the conflicting evidence 
before reaching his decision. (Decision 2 at 1 0-12) For these reasons the Board sustains the Hearing 
Officer's finding that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" based on fear of retaliation after 
Mr. Haun became executive director of the Department.44 
As the Board has determined that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" for filing their 
grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the Executive Director of the Department, 
it is not necessary for it to reach the Hearing Officer's decision that Appellants met the standard for 
"excusable neglect" prior to July 1997. (See Decision 2 at 12t5 Even assuming, however, 
Appellants' fear of retaliation under the previous administration would bring them within the 
definition of" excusable neglect," the Board finds those fears reasonably should have dissipated after 
Mr. Haun became Executive Director. The Board reaches this decision in light of the evidentiary 
record cited above establishing the significant efforts made by Exec. Dir. Haun to create an 
atmosphere where employees could feel free to file grievances without fear of retaliation or reprisal 
and the fact that Appellants filed their grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the 
Executive Director. 
The Utah Legislature, in creating a forum for employees to seek redress from problems 
connected with their employment, set specific and unambiguous limits on the time frames in which 
a grievance can be filed and the relief that can be granted. These limitations are set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5). 
44To the extent that the Hearing Officer's decision can be read to find that had Appellants filed their 
grievance before July 1997, they would have been entitled to four years of"on-call" compensation, the Board 
is modifying that decision pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(b) and (8)(c). As stated previously, an 
employee may never submit a grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
(Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b)) Based upon this law, even assuming the actions of the previous 
administration would bring Appellants' failure to file within the defmition of"excusable neglect," the scope 
of their remedy would not extend beyond one year from the date Appellants filed their grievance. 
45Though they never appealed this fmding, in their Response Brief After Remand, the Department 
expresses concerns with this conclusion stating that: "Though the Agency questions certain legal aspects 
of his opinion as addressed below, the end result of his decision is legally correct." (I d. at 13-14) 
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In addition, the Legislature also enacted prohibitions concerning reprisals against career 
service employees for use of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Cabined in all these 
statutory provisions, the Board fmds a Legislative process designed to promote a fair, thorough and 
expeditious means to resolve concerns related to public employment. (See generally Taylor v. Utah 
State Training School775 P.2d 432) (Utah Ct. App.) (1989)) 
This process specifically contemplates that employees be able file grievances free of fear of 
retaliation or reprisal. At the same time, however, this process also does not permit employees to 
sit on their rights and deprive State agencies or the CSRB of the ability to address or rectify 
employee concerns or management mistakes at the earliest possible date. Failure to adhere to either 
of these mandates runs afoul of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act. 
In reaching our decision herein, the Board notes that the statutory framework set forth in the 
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act can only protect an employee from actual retaliation 
not from fear, whether real or supposed, of such retaliation. By failing to file their grievance when 
the "event" occurred, Appellants essentially stripped the CSRB or its Hearing Officer of the ability 
to protect them against actual retaliation. The Board cannot allow this conduct any more than it 
could allow retaliation or reprisal against an employee exercising his or her right by submitting a 
grievance. This Board feels that any other ruling by it in the instant case would only foster what the 
statute explicitly prohibits. For this reason, the Board fmds as a matter oflaw, that fear of retaliation 
in and of itself, is insufficient to establish "excusable neglect" under our rules.46 
Finally, the Board does not believe that the Hearing Officer's decision violates the Open 
Courts provision of the Utah Constitution as applied to Appellants.47 In reaching this decision, the 
Board reiterates that the 20-day limitation on employee grievances has been a threshold requirement 
of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures for many years. As stated by the Hearing Officer: 
46Because the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants did not have 
"excusable neglect" for filing their grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the Executive 
Director of the Department, it is unnecessary for it to examine the Hearing Officer's conclusion that 
Appellants had "excusable neglect" prior to Mr. Haun becoming the Executive Director of the Department. 
However, to the extent that our decision herein modifies the Hearing Officer's conclusion relative to 
"excusable neglect" prior to 1997, the Board does so pursuant to CSRB rule Rl37-1-22(4)(b) and -(8)(c). 
47The Board recognizes the Article VITI, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution reserves solely to the 
Utah Supreme Court the authority to declare any law unconstitutional. Based upon this fact, the Board is 
extremely hesitant to address this issue and will do so only to the extent that this provision applies to 
Appellants. 
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The underlying tenant [sic] of the grievance system and the time limits 
imposed on the filing of grievances is to encourage grievances at the point 
of a "grievable event" in order to allow the State to resolve those 
grievances at the earliest possible time. See Taylor v. Utah State Training 
School, 775 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1989). When a grievable event occurs, 
such as a denial of on-call pay to which an employee is otherwise entitled, 
the employee is obligated to file a timely grievance or lose his/her right to 
grieve. This limitation is not a violation of the "open courts" provision of 
the Utah Constitution. Indeed State employees have a remedy with ultimate 
court review, provided they follow the rules applicable to that remedy .... 
(Decision on Grievants' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Decision on Agency's 
Motion to Dismiss at 3 (Reconsideration Decision)) 
In the instant case, the facts establish that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 
1998. As a result of this grievance, Appellants were permitted to submit amended time sheets listing 
"on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed their grievance and the forward to include the 
time Appellants could establish they were "on -call." (Agency Ex. 4) It is clear that Appellants were 
heard on their grievance and were granted a recovery, albeit less than they sought. As with all 
limitations on action, an individual may either comply with the time limits imposed and secure his 
claims or ignore those limitations and be precluded from any available remedy. In the instant case, 
the Hearing Officer found no violation of the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
(Decision I at 5) Appellants' arguments have failed to persuade us otherwise. The Hearing 
Officer's decision on this issue is thus sustained. 
DECISION 
After careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's 
decision that Appellants are entitled to "on-call" compensation for any time that they were in 
"on-call" status beginning at a point 20 working days prior to the date they filed their grievance and 
continuing thereafter for as long as they were required to be on-call. The Board hereby corrects the 
Hearing Officer to find that Appellants filed their grievance on January 3 0, 199 8. The Board further 
upholds the Hearing Officer's decision that Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1 ( 5) jurisdictionally limits 
the scope of relief that can be granted to the 20 working-day period immediately preceding the date 
a grievance is filed and that the CSRB does not have jurisdiction over grievable events that are not 
timely grieved under the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Finally, the Board fmds the 
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Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants did not have "excusable neglect" to wait until 
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance to be both reasonable and rational and supported by the 
evidentiary record. 
DATED this 14th day of April2004. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Blake S. Atkin, Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Member 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, Rl37-1-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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Exhibit B 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
W. FRED HURST, DAN LEATHAM, 
ROBERT E. STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, 
and HAROLD W. JOHNSON, 
Grievants, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 
AFTER REMAND 
Case No. 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 
Hearing Officer: K. Allan Zabel 
On_ May 2, 2001, the Department of Corrections (Agency), by and through its attorney of 
record, Daryl L. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion in Limine. 
Both motions were accompanied by supporting memoranda. On June 25,2001, Grievants, by and 
through their attorney of record, Phillip W. Dyer, filed a memorandum in response to the Agency's 
motions and memoranda. On July 31, 2001, Mr. Bell filed a reply memorandum. Neither party 
requested oral argument. On October 12, 2001, the Hearing Officer issued his decision granting the 
Agency's motions. Grievants appealed the Step 5 decision to the Career Service Review Board (Step 
6). After briefing by the parties and oral argument, the Board remanded the case to the Step 5 
Hearing Officer "to make an evidentiary determination on the sole issue as to whether there was 
excusable neglect allowing Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance 
concerning on-call time." 
A hearing was held on December 5, 2002, to take evidence as to the issue of excusable 
neglect. Patrick Nolan, Assistant Attorney General, was present as counsel for the Agency. 
David Salazar, Human Resource Director, and Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager, were 
present as management representatives for the Agency. Phillip Dyer was present as counsel for 
Grievants. Grievants Harold W. Johnson, Daniel Leatham, Timothy Slocum and Robert E. Steele, 
were present. Grievant W. Fred Hurst was not present. A certified court reporter made a verbatim 
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evidence were received into the record. 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to consider this matter is found 
at Utah Code, §67-19a-202 (2000), and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 et seq. (2000). The 
authority of the CSRB to remand this case to the Step 5 Hearing Officer, and for the Hearing Officer 
to consider the matter on remand, is found at Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22(7). 
Having heard and reviewed the evidence of record and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, the Hearing Officer [Presiding Officer, Utah Code, Subsection 63-46b-2(1)(h) (2000)], 
now makes and enters the following Statement of the Issues, Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue to be considered on remand is whether there was excusable neglect allowing 
Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning entitlement to 
compensation for on-call time. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
NOTE: The Findings ofF act contained in the Hearing Officer's decision issued October 12, 
2001, are herewith supplemented by the following Findings. 
I. Grievants were entitled to compensation for on-call time during the period of time when 
they were required to carry pagers during off-duty hours, and when they were assigned commute 
vehicles. Grievant Slocum had a commute vehicle until February 1996. Thereafter, Grievant 
Slocum continued to be on call by reason of a Post Order. Grievants Leatham, Steele, Johnson and 
Hurst were on call by virtue of the requirement to carry pagers and the assignment of commute 
vehicles. These four Grievants had commute vehicles from 1994 to January 1998. 
2. Since 1990 the Agency has had 4 Executive Directors." Their terms of office were as 
follows: 
Name 
Gary DeLand 
Lane McCotter 
Pete Haun 
Mike Chabries 
Term of Office 
From To 
1/4/92 
7/23/97 
1/6/01 
1/4/92 
7/11/97 
1/2/01 
Present 
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transferred either arbitrarily or as retaliation for filing grievances or complaints. 
4. Prior to 1992, there was an occasion when an employee identified as Mr. Lund was 
ordered by the Executive Director to delete unfavorable information from a report about an employee 
who was under investigation at the time. The employee refused to obey the order, and ended up 
resigning from the Agency. 
5. On one occasion prior to July 7, 1997, the Agency Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
reported more than 80 hours on his time sheet for a two-week period. The Executive Director 
ordered the hearing officer to change his time sheet to show 80 hours worked for the time period. 
The ALJ altered his time sheet to show 80 hours, but submitted it with a statement that he was 
submitting a false time sheet. The ALJ worked in the same general area as the office of the 
Executive Director, and observed the Executive Director react angrily to the statement, but then 
signed the time sheet. 
6. The Agency ALJ was once threatened with termination by the same Executive Director 
for issuing a Report and Recommended Decision concerning an Agency employee. 
7. During the same Executive Director's last year in office, and some time after the ALJ had 
been threatened with termination for the Report and Recommendation, the Executive Director issued 
a General Order prohibiting the ALJ from hearing any employee grievances. This was a significant 
change in duties for the ALJ, as he had for many years prior to the new General Order, routinely 
heard employee's grievances and made Reports and Recommendations for the Executive Director. 
8. About two months after the General Order was issued, as the ALJ was giving employee 
training to a group of Agency employees, he explained the General Order to the employees. One 
employee asked, "How can we get a fair hearing?" 
9. The ALJ was given a written reprimand by the same Executive Director on the last day 
of that Director's administration. The ALJ felt that the reprimand was in retaliation for his open 
disagreement with several of the Director's actions concerning Agency employees. 
10. Prior to becoming Executive Director in July 1997, Pete Haun had worked for the federal 
government in the Salt Lake City area for 25 years, in the field of pardons and parole. He then 
worked on the Utah Board ofPardons from 1989 until his appointment as Executive Director of the 
Agency. During these years, Mr. Haun became aware of some of the attitudes and perceptions of 
employees in the Agency. 
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General Order that prohibited the ALJ from hearing employee grievances. Mr. Haun instituted an 
open door policy, and over the years of his administration, he visited many Agency facilities and 
talked to hundreds of employees. He used the RAP Sheet, which was an Agency internal newsletter, 
meetings with employees, and word of mouth to let the employees know they could file grievances 
without fear of retaliation. 
12. In October 1997, Mr. Haun wrote in the RAP Sheet, the Agency's in-house newsletter: 
"Some of the immediate steps we have taken to promote positive 
working conditions for employees include a top-to-bottom review of 
the Code of Conduct, and a complete revision of staff discipline and 
grievance procedures. Before the changes are adopted, we will ask 
for suggestions and employee review. We will make these changes 
available for your review by the beginning of December." 
This information was repeated in a general way in the same newsletter, in a section entitled "Do You 
Have Any Recommendations?" 
13. Mr. Haun felt that the Bureau of Investigations within the Agency was generally 
perceived by Agency employees as somewhat "high-handed" in its dealings with Agency employees. 
It even investigated itself. He therefore decided to reorganize the Bureau. This decision· caused a 
degree of dissatisfaction in some of the management employees of the Bureau, including some of 
the Grievants. 
14. Approximately 150 audits of the Agency led to the conclusion that the Agency was out 
of compliance with State laws, rules or policies in approximately 182 areas. One of these areas was 
the use of commute cars by Agency management employees. Mr. Haun's decision to discontinue 
the use of commute cars was to put the Agency in compliance with State requirements. 
15. On December 16, 1997, Mr. Haun issued a letter to employees of the Gunnison facility, 
advising the employees of his intent to visit the facility and meet with employees. As a response to 
communications he had previously received, Mr. Haun specifically stated that retribution against 
employees for stating concerns or problems would not be tolerated. 
16. After making the announcement of his planned visit to the Gunnison facility, Mr. Haun 
received an anonymous call or letter saying that people would not come forward out of fear. 
Mr. Haun' s prior experience with anonymous communications led him to believe there was no merit 
to the claim. 
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change an institutional culture. Mr. Haun felt this was particularly true for an institutional culture 
as deeply seated as the Agency's. 
18. A current employee of the Agency, Mr. Lebounty, was involuntarily transferred twice 
during the 1990's. The second involuntary transfer occl..UTed during Mr. Haun' s administration. 
19. One of the Grievants, Harold Johnson, who was serving as Deputy Warden in July 1997 
when Mr. Haun became Executive Director of the Agency, saw several staff members who were 
transferred, demoted or dismissed after filing grievances prior to Mr. Haun' s administration. 
20. One of the Grievants, Daniel Leatham, heard a rumor after his commute car was taken 
away, that the cars were taken away because the Agency did not want to be obligated for on-call pay. 
Mr. Leatham thereafter researched whether on-call time_ was compensable for management 
employees. After concluding that on-call time was cotnpensable for himself and others in his 
situation, Mr. Leatham told his fellow Grievants about his conclusion. Mr. Leatham's research 
occurred during the first or second week of January 1998. 
21. State employees have been entitled to on-call pay by Utah Administrative Code (1997) 
R4 77 -8-6(8)( c )(i) or its predecessors since at least 1991. 
22. Grievants filed their grievance with the Department Head, Mr. Haun, on February 5, 
1998. 
23. When the grievance reached Executive Director Haun' s level, he remanded it to 
Scott Carver, an employee in the Division oflnstitutional Operations, with an invitation to Grievants 
to mediate the matter with Mr. Carver. 
24. After receiving the invitation from Mr. Haun to mediate their grievance, Grievants met 
with Mr. Carver. At some point in the meeting between .Mr. Carver and Grievants, Mr. Carver told 
Grievants that he, Carver, would not have filed a grievance because "that's just something you don't 
do over this kind of issue." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
r. The time !imitations contained in §67- I 9a-40 r (5)( a), Utah Code, are jurisdictional and 
constitute a limit on the scope of relief that can be granted to Grievants. 
~. The time limitation contained in §67-19a-401(5)(b), Utah Code, is jurisdictional and 
constitutes an ultimate limit on the scope of relief that can be granted by State agencies and the 
CSRB when considering grievances. 
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improper conduct or knowing violations of statute and policy that were not timely grieved. 
4. Grievants did not have excusable neglect under Utah Code §67 -19a-40 1 (5)( a) and Utah 
Administrative Code Rl37-l-13(3) for the late filing of their grievance. 
5. Both the Agency and the CSRB are limited by Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a) to granting 
relief for a period of20 working days before F ebruary-5, 1998, and for all pay periods since that date 
for which Grievants can establish by satisfactory evidence the amount of on-call time for which 
compensation is owed them under the provisions of Utah Administrative Code (1997) 
R 4 77 -8-6(8)( c )(i). 
DECISION 
As noted in the original Step 5 decision, Grievants argue that they should be entitled to 
recover on-call pay going back for a period of four years from the date of their grievance. They base 
this argument on a theory that the 20-day time limit for filing grievances [§67-19a-401(5)] only 
governs jurisdiction, and not the scope of recovery. That issue was fully discussed in the original 
Step 5 decision. 
The issue now to be decided is whether Grievants had excusable neglect for filing their 
grievance more than 20 working days after the "event" or action which gave rise to their grievance. 
The time at which the event arose in this case was discussed in some detail in the original Step 5 
decision. The Hearing Officer notes that even if it is found that Grievants had excusable neglect for 
the delay in filing their grievance in this case, excusable neglect does not extend beyond one year 
from the date of the event giving rise to the grievance. Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(b) provides: 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection S(a) [excusable neglect], an 
employee may not submit a grievance more than one year after the 
event giving rise to the grievance. 
This provision is clearly jurisdictional, in that it prohibits the consideration of any grievance that is 
filed more than one year after the date of the event which is grieved. 
Grievants seek compensation for on-call time as provided in Utah Administrative Code 
R4 77 -8-6-(7)( c), as it existed during the years Grievants were assigned to be on call. The Agency's 
ALJ found as fact in his Report and Recommendation to the Agency's Executive Director that 
Grievants had an objective fear of retaliation if they filed a grievance over the issue of on-call 
compensation at any time prior to July 1997. The undersigned Hearing Officer, for purposes of 
considering the Agency's Motion to Dismiss, accepted this finding in the original Step 5 decision. 
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the period of time for which Grievants were entitled to on-call compensation by going back 
20 working days from the date the grievance was filed. The filing date of the grievance was fmmd 
by the ALI to be February 11, 1998. The question of when the grievance was filed will be 
considered at another point in this decision. It is sufficient for purposes of considering when the 
grievable event occurred, that the event is not determined by the date of filing of the grievance. 
In the original Step 5 decision, this Hearing Officer found that the grievable event or action 
in this case occurred when the new Executive Director, Pete Haun, invited grievances in July 1997. 
But this conclusion was based on the Hearing Officer's analysis of the case under the doctrine that 
when considering a motion to dismiss, the evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Now that an evidentiary hearing has been held to gather evidence on the issue of 
excusable neglect, it becomes necessary to also determine when the event giving rise to the grievance 
actually occurred. 
In Karber, 6 CSRB 57 (Step 6), 1997, the CSRB dealt with the question of whether ongoing 
discussions constitute the event, or if the event or action occurs when the fma1 agency notice is 
issued after discussions have been completed. The Karber decision established that the event or 
action occurred when the notice was issued. There was no comparable notice or action taken in the 
instant case. 
We are given further guidance on the issue of what is the event or action in the case of 
Kurt Zimmerman v. Department of Environmental Quality, CSRB Case No. J.H. 52 (1991), which 
was cited in the original Step 5 decision ofthis case, and which, like the instant case, involved a 
question of compensation for on-call time. In Zimmerman, the CSRB Hearing Officer concluded 
that "an action took place when Grievant started carrying a pager and received compensatory time 
for doing so." In the instant case, Grievants did not receive compensation in any form for their 
on-call time prior to July 1997. However, as noted in the original Step 5 decision, they knew they 
were on call when they were given pagers and told to be available at any time whenever the pager 
was activated. 
Unfortunately, little evidence was offered as to when Grievants were first told that they 
would be on call during their off-duty hours. However, neither side disputes that Grievants served 
on call prior to July 1997. One Grievant, Mr. Steele, testified that he carried a pager or cell phone 
for about 20 years. The Agency ALJ found, in his Report and Recommendation, that all of the 
Grievants were entitled to compensation for on-call time during the period of time when they were 
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in sometime in February 1996. Thereafter, Grievant Slocum continued to be on call by reason of a 
Post Order. Grievants Leatham, Steele, Johnson and Hurst were on call by virtue of the requirement 
to carry pagers and the assignment of commute vehicles. These four Grievants had commute 
vehicles from 1994 to January 1998. Grievants seek as their remedy compensation for on-call time 
going back four years from the date of their grievance. 
For purposes of this decision it is concluded that each of the Grievants carried a pager, had 
a commute car, or was otherwise under a duty, by virtue of their management or supervisory 
responsibilities, to be on call for four years prior to filing their grievance. Therefore, the action or 
event pertinent to this case occurred at the time Grievants entered into a duty to be on call, or when 
the State instituted its policy of compensating FLSA exempt employees for on-call time, whichever 
occurred later. 
Inasmuch as Zimmerman, which involved compensation for on-call time of an FLSA exempt 
employee,_was decided in 1991, there can be no dispute that it was state policy to pay on-call 
compensation four years prior to the filing of the grievance herein. Thus, the action or event which 
gave rise to the instant grievance occurred four or more years prior to the filing of the grievance. 1 
Having determined when the event giving rise to the grievance occurred, we are left with the 
need to determine the basic issue for which this case was remanded; that is, did Grievants have 
excusable neglect for the delay in filing their grievance? If, as concluded above, the action or event 
occurred in 1994, the Agency, the CSRB Hearing Officer, and the CSRB itself would have no 
jurisdiction to hear the instant grievance, because it was clearly filed more than one year after the 
event. However, this case is not that simple and we must, therefore, understand the meaning of the 
term "excusable neglect" as that term is used in Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a). 
First, we look to the statutory provision itself. §67 -19a-40 1 (5)( a) contains no language that 
could be construed as a definition of the term. However, 401(5)(a) states "Unless the employee 
meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule ... " [Emphasis added.] Thus, the 
CSRB was given authority by the Legislature to make rules governing the requirements for excusable 
1 While there may be some dispute as to this conclusion, the only evidence presented in the evidentiary 
hearing on the point was Mr. Steele's testimony that he had carried a pager or cell phone for about 20 years. 
However, the Agency ALJ's Report and Recommendation, with its Findings of Fact, was submitted as evidence by 
the Agency. Grievants seek a remedy going back four years, which would take their grievance back to sometime in 
1994. Inasmuch as the Agency's evidence supports Grievants' claim ofbeing on call from 1994 on, there appears to 
be no dispute between the parties that the point in time when the action or "event'' from which the grievance arose 
occurred in 1994. It may even have occurred earlier than 1994, but Grievants' claim only goes back the four years. 
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governing 'definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance process established by this 
chapter[.]" 
CSRB R137-1-2 defines excusable neglect as follows; 
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a 
reasonably prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper 
steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the person's own 
carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in the processing of a 
grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable 
hindrance or accident. [Emphasis added.] 
This definition is consistent with court decisions from the federal and numerous state jurisdictions. 
See Words and Phrases, "Excusable Neglect." 
There have been no court decisions in Utah specifically addressing the definition of 
"excusable neglect" as used in Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a) or in Utah Administrative Code 
Rl37-l-2.- However, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the case of Reisbeck v. HCA Health 
Services ofUtah, 2 P.3rd 447 (Utah 2000), provides an illuminating analysis of the term "excusable 
neglect" as used in Rule 4( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). That rule pertains to the 
grounds on which a late appeal may be allowed in the appellate courts of Utah. While not directly 
on point with the issue presented by the instant case, it gives some indication of the Court's view of 
what constitutes excusable neglect. 
The Court noted that the standards applicable to excusable neglect and good cause, as those 
terms are used in URCP 4( e), are separate, if not distinct, standards. The court stated: 
By this standard, it is apparent rule 4( e) permits a trial court to extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal based on two general categories 
of justification: (1) excusable neglect, which is an admittedly 
neglectful delay that is nevertheless excused by special 
circumstances; or (2) good cause, which pertains to special 
circumstances that are essentially beyond a party's control. 
[Emphasis in original.] 
Reisbeck, at 450. The court further explained that "good cause remains a more liberal standard." 
Id 
The CSRB definition of excusable neglect actually combines elements of both excusable 
neglect and good cause. It clarifies that the delay in filing a grievance or moving it forward cannot 
be the result of the grievant's own carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the grievance 
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an accident. A hindrance is generally defined as an impediment or obstacle to any action. See 
Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary (1937), or Webster's New International Dictionary (1988 
Edition). In this case, Grievants contend that their delay was caused by an unavoidable hindrance, 
referring specifically to their fear of retaliation if they filed a grievance. 
The Reisbeck court quoted with approval the holding in the case of West v. Grand County, 
942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), that excusable neglect cases are "highly fact intensive." The facts of the 
instant case, as presented at the evidentiary hearing, compel the conclusion that prior to July 1997, 
there was genuine cause for fear of retaliation at the Agency. However, did that fear constitute an 
unavoidable hindrance to filing the grievance? 
§67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(1) The department shall establish a career service system designed in a manner that 
will provide for the effective implementation of the following merit principles: 
* * * 
(g) providing a formal procedure for processing the appeals and 
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint, 
or reprisal. 
* * * 
(2) The principles in Subsection (1) shall govern interpretation and implementation 
of this chapter. 
To allow an administration to create or maintain an atmosphere in which employees are afraid to 
exercise their rights and lay claim to benefits for which they qualify, because they know that such 
an exercise will result in adverse personnel action, is contrary to the intent and purpose of the 
Personnel Management Act. Therefore, this Hearing Officer must agree with Grievants that fear of 
retaliation prior to July 1997 was sufficient on the facts of this case to constitute an unavoidable 
hindrance, and imbued Grievants' failure to file a timely grievance with excusable neglect for 
purposes of §67-19-401(5)(a). 
This brings us to the crux of this case, which is whether the fear of retaliation was justified 
by the facts of the case from July 1997 to the date on which Grievants fmally filed their grievance. 
To summarize the facts, without minimizing the reality of the atmosphere in which Grievants 
worked, we know the following: The new Executive Director in July 1997, Pete Haun, came to the 
Agency with an awareness of its culture of personnel administration. Mr. Haun immediately made 
changes such as rescission of the General Order prohibiting the Agency ALI from hearing employee 
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Grievants were told to report on-call time for periods when each was the Officer-in-Charge. 
Mr. Haun made it clear that there would be no retaliation for filing of grievances. He made 
an extensive effort to let employees know that he wanted to improve working conditions in the 
Agency. 
The Hearing Officer notes that Grievant Leatham testified he was told for nine years that as 
an FLSA exempt employee, he was not entitled to on-call compensation. Had the Agency, through 
any of its management employees, intentionally or negligently withheld from Grievants the 
knowledge of their entitlement to on-call compensation, such conduct could, in some circumstances, 
constitute an unavoidable hindrance which would invoke the excusable neglect standard on behalf 
of Grievants. However, in this case the knowledge of a right or entitlement to on-call compensation 
was not limited to a select few in the Agency. Rather, it was a matter of State administrative rule, 
which was open to all employees and to all members of the public. Furthermore, Grievants began 
reporting a.portion of their on-call time in July 1997, after Mr. Haun became the Agency Executive 
Director. Thus, Grievants' contention that they did not know of their right to claim on-call 
compensation is not convincing. 
In addition, Grievant Leatham testified that after he turned in his commute car, he heard a 
rumor that the commute cars were taken away so the Agency would not have to pay on-call 
compensation. Mr. Leatham then decided to research the issue and learned of his entitlement to 
on-call compensation. The result of his research clearly shows that the information was readily 
available at any time, had he or any of the other Grievants chosen to look at the State rules governing 
on-call compensation. 
Mr. Haun acknowledged in his testimony that an agency culture is not changed quickly. 
According to his own studies, such a change may take as many as seven years to be fully 
implemented. Assuming the validity of Mr. Haun's observations, the facts remain that the State 
administrative rule governing on-call compensation was readily available to Grievants at any time. 
What is more important, Grievants became aware of their entitlement to some form of on-call 
compensation in July 1997, when they began reporting such time during periods when they were the 
Officer-in-Charge. 
Finally, there is an inherent inconsistency in Grievants' argument that they continued to fear 
possible retaliation after July 1997, while simultaneously reporting on-call time for which they were 
compensated. Considering all of the foregoing facts, the Hearing Officer feels compelled to 
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gnevance. 
In its Remand Order, the Board noted in a footnote that the actual date on which the 
grievance was filed is unclear. The Agency concluded that it was filed on February 11, 1998. The 
grievance itself was dated January 30, 1998. The CSRB received a copy of the grievance on 
February 5, 199 8. Although the question of when the grievance was actually filed with the Agency 
was discussed in the evidentiary hearing after remand, no additional evidence was offered, and the 
parties continued to disagree on the issue. In the absence of any evidence from the Agency 
establishing when the grievance was actually received in the office of the Executive Director, the 
Hearing Officer must conclude that the date a copy was received in the office of the CSRB, 
February 5, 1998, is the proper date ofthe grievance. 
DECISION 
The grievance to the Agency Head in this case was filed on February 5, 1998. Grievants met 
the standard for excusable neglect in failing to file a grievance for on-call compensation prior to the 
14th pay period in July 1997, when they began reporting on-call time. Grievants were not, however, 
subject to unavoidable hindrance after the 14th pay period in 1997, and therefore did not meet the 
excusable neglect standard after that time. Therefore, Grievants are entitled to on-call compensation 
for any time they can prove by satisfactory evidence that they served on call beginning at a point 
20 working days prior to February 5, 1998, and continuing thereafter for as long as they were 
required to be on call. 
DATED this 8th day of January 2003. 
<~ r<.:Allimzabcl 
Hearing Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(1)(a)(i). 
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Exhibit C 
Dan Leatham, Bob Steele, Tim Slocum, 
Bill Johnson, and Fred Hurst, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
Department of Corrections, 
Division of Institutional Operations, 
Respondent 
Report and Recommendation 
Case No. 98 HLH 5-G 
ALJ R. Spencer Robinson 
The parties appeared before this ALJ on May 9, 2000. Mr. Phillip W. Dyer represented 
the grievants. Mr. Ed Kingsford represented the Department. The hearing was held as part of the 
Department=s internal grievance procedure, in consonance with the rules established by the 
Career Service Review Board under 67-19a-203, and under the authority of 64-13-28. 
An audio tape record of the hearing was made. The parties called witnesses, who testified 
under oath, and introduced documents into evidence. The record was left open to allow Mr. Dyer 
to submit totals of the dollar amounts his clients claiming. That information arrived on May 10 
and 11, 2000. The record was then closed. Based on the evidence provided by the parties, and 
information in the records of the Department, this ALJ makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The grievants were career service employees at the time of filing the grievance on or 
about February 11, 1998. Messrs. Leatham, Steele, Slocum, and Hurst are presently 
employed by the Department of Corrections. Mr. Johnson retired after the filing of the 
grievance. 
2. Grievants were all part of the upper management of the Division of Institutional 
Operations during the times relevant to this grievance. They were told they were FLSA 
exempt. For most of the time since 1994 they were not required to complete time sheets 
They began completing time sheets in July of 1997. The time sheets were for periods 
when they served as the Officer In Charge. They claimed and received on-call pay as 
listed on those time sheets. 
3. Grievants were given pagers in order to facilitate contact with them. They were expected 
to respond if the pager was activated. They were expected to remain within the range of 
000013 
the pager unless on approved leave or if they had permission of their supervisors. 
4. While on the pagers, grievants were able to remain at their homes, shop, dine out, attend 
movies, go to church, and engage in other personal activities. The grievants had to plan 
for alternative means for family members to return home should they be paged and asked 
to come in. There were times personal activities were interrupted by pages. The 
frequency of these interruptions was not established by the evidence. 
5. Grievants were assigned commute vehicles. Documents introduced by the grievants 
establishes they had approved commute vehicles in 1995. The Request of Commute 
Authorization forms bear the signatures of former Division of Institutional Operations 
Director J. Terry Bartlett and former Executive Director 0. Lane McCotter. An illegible 
signature appears on the line for the Department of Administrative Services 
Representative. 
6. Department records contain Request for Commute Authorization for all the grievants 
signed by former Division of Institutional Operations Director Terry Bartlett and former 
Executive Director 0. Lane McCotter on March 31, 1997. No signature from a DAS 
representative appears on the copies of these documents. Department records contain DF-
61's from January of 1998 for Messrs Steele, Hurst, and Johnson with vehicle information 
matching that listed on the above noted Requests for Commute Authorization for those 
gentlemen. 
7. Mr. Slocum testified that in February of 1996 he turned in his commute vehicle. 
8. Mr. Slocum=s Post Order, FW 08 Deputy Bureau Chief- Support Services Bureau-
Draper Site, states the incumbent shall Acarry a pager and respond to service upon 
activation during day or night. FW 08/02.01 (E)(l)(g). 
9. Mr. Leatham testified he had a commute vehicle through 1998. Mr. Steele testified he 
had a commute vehicle from 1994 to January of 1998. Mr. Johnson testified he had a 
commute vehicle from 1994 to 1998. Mr. Hurst testified he had a commute vehicle from 
1994 to 1998. Documents within the Department of Corrections indicate these grievants 
lost their commute vehicles at the end of January 1998. 
10. Beginning in pay period 13 in 1997 Messrs Leatham and Steele submitted time sheets 
listing on-call hours. Messrs Johnson and Hurst did so in pay period 14 of 1997. Mr. 
Slocum did so in pay period 25 of 1998. They were compensated for the on-call time 
listed on the time sheets. These time sheets reflect grievants= assignment as the Officer 
in Charge (OIC). 
11. Under the previous administration the grievants did not submit time sheets. It was their 
understanding that the previous administration did not want hours worked documented. 
2 
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The grievants understood part of the reason for them not submitting time sheets was that 
they were considered FLSA exempt. 
12. The grievants had a subjective fear of retaliation if they challenged the practices of the 
previous administration. The grievants had been subject to transfers and had seen others 
transferred. They drew the inference that individuals challenging the previous 
administration would experience retaliation. 
13. In 96 OLM 6-D, an employee of the Department was served an Administrative Complaint 
informing her she was being demoted and transferred. She requested a hearing, as 
provided in AE 03. An audit of her position and activities followed. She was then served 
an Amended Administrative Complaint informing her that her employment would be 
terminated. Following the hearing, an employee in the office ofDivision of Institutional 
Operations Director Bartlett, who participated in the audit, made a comment to this ALJ. 
She said that if the subject of the disciplinary action had not appealed the original 
Administrative Complaint that the Department would not have pursued the matter further, 
despite the information the audit produced. This ALJ noted the comment in his Report 
and Recommendation. 
14. The grievants= fear of retaliation if they had filed a grievance under the previous 
administration was objectively reasonable. 
15. The new administration, which took office in July of 1997, stated it would not retaliate 
against people who filed grievances and that if employees had grievances they should file 
them. No evidence was produced to show these representations have proven false. If the 
grievants harbored fears of retaliation for filing this grievance, they were not objectively 
reasonable. 
16. The grievants also testified they were not aware they could claim on-time until shortly 
before they filed the grievance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Grievants were all career service employees at the time they filed the grievance, and thus 
were eligible to use the grievance process. 
2. It is the event, not the discovery of a legal theory on which one may make a claim, that 
triggers the running of the period of limitations. Grievants discovery of a legal theory 
does not control. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Revnolds, 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct.App. 
1996). 
3. Absent excusable neglect, 67 -19a-40 1 permits the filing of a grievance Aonly if the 
employee submits the grievance@ within twenty working days of the event giving rise to 
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the grievance or knowledge of the event. This ALI agrees with the CSRB interpretation 
of this statute in Karber v. Utah Department of Corrections, 6 CSRB 57 (1997). Filing 
within twenty working days is mandatory. Failure to timely file is jurisdictional. 
4. Assuming the actions of the previous administration would bring the grievants failure to 
file within the definition of excusable neglect, the current administration=s statements 
regarding grievances, and the seven month period the grievants had to observe the 
response of the administration to grievances before they filed, takes them outside of 
excusable neglect. 
5. Grievants are eligible for on-call pay for a period of twenty working days back from the 
date they filed the grievance, and prospectively from the date of filing, if the evidence 
shows they were on-call. 
6. Management has the discretion to go back one year from the date the grievants filed. See 
67-19a-401 (5)(b). 
7. Article XVI, Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution does not apply in this case. 
Grievants requested remedy was to be made whole for lost on-call compensation. Time 
spent on-call does not fall within the definition ofhours worked found in R477-l-l (3). 
Being on-call is not part of the work day. 
8. The extent of interference with grievants time, based on the evidence in the record, does 
not establish grievants were on-call as that term has been interpreted by the federal courts 
in FLSA cases. See Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653 (lOth Cir. 1988), 
Boehm v. Kansas Citv Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182 (lOth Cir. 1989) and Renfro v. 
City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (lOth Cir. 1991), Gilligan v. City ofEmpori1!, 986 F.2d 
410, (lOth Cir. 1993), Andrews V. Town of Skiatook, 123 F.3d 1327, 123 F.3d 1327 (lOth 
Cir. 1997). 
9. At the time the grievance was filed, R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) read as follows: 
AOn-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call 
work shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the 
employee is on-call. 
(i) Time is considered Aon-call time@ when the employee has freedom of 
movement in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty.@ 
(ii) Employees record on-call time as Aon-call paid@ not as Ahours worked@ on 
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period. Any time actually 
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of 15 minutes as 
Ahours worked@ in addition to on-call time.@ 
4 
000018 
10. Following this becoming an issue, DHRM amended its rule. Effective in June of 1998 
R477-8-6 (c) read: 
(c) On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call 
work shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the 
employee is on-call. (i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has 
freedom of movement in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty. 
(ii) An employee must be directed by his supervisor, either verbally or in writing, that he 
is on call for a specified time period. Carrying a beeper or cell phone shall not constitute 
on call time without a specific directive from a supervisor. (iii) The employee shall record 
the hours spent in on call status on his time sheet in order to be paid. 
11. Under either defmition of Aon-call@ Mr. Slocum=s Post Order puts him in that status. 
He is entitled to on-call pay during the twenty working day period prior to February 11, 
1998. Management has the discretion, but not the duty, to compensate him during the 
year preceding the filing of his grievance. Mr. Slocum is also entitled prospectively to on-
call pay until his Post Order or assignment changed, or until he was expressly instructed 
to disregard that portion of his Post Order, or in some other way put on actual notice that 
someone with the authority to do so had altered his duties as the Deputy Warden of 
Support Services. Mr. Slocum should submit amended time sheets reflecting those 
periods when he was on-call. This ALJ retains jurisdiction to take evidence on the issues 
regarding Mr. Slocum=s status prospectively from February 11, 1998, if necessary. 
12. Messrs Leatham, Steele, Johnson, and Hurst are entitled to on-call pay for the twenty 
working day period prior to February 11, 1998, during which they were assigned a 
commute vehicle. Management has the discretion, but not the duty, to compensate them 
during the year preceding the filing of this grievance. One of the conditions in the 
Division of Administrative Services (DAS) rules for being given a commute vehicle is 
being on-call. See DAS Rule 15.4, section 8, which requires the employee being given 
the commute vehicle to be on-call as defmed in R477-8-6 (c). Rule 15.4 incorporates the 
DHRM definition of on-call by reference. The meaning of on-call must be the same 
whether the issue is a commute vehicle or pay. The grievants cannot be on-call in order 
to qualify for the commute vehicle, but not on-call for purposes of pay. Messrs Leatham, 
Steele, Johnson, and Hurst should submit amended time sheets reflecting those periods 
when they were on-call by virtue of having a commute vehicle. 
13. 
14. Inasmuch as the parties may not have anticipated the bases for this ALJ=s decision, 
jurisdiction is retained to clarify or supplement the record. 
DISCUSSION 
This ALJ previously denied the grievants= motion to amend to include Article XVI, 
Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Nothing coming forth since that decision on February 7, 
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2000, has altered this ALJ=s decision regarding the motion to amend. 
Had the motion to amend been granted, it is unlikely the FLSA multiplier of time and one-
half would have been applied to the time grievants were on-call. Federal courts interpreting and 
applying the FLSA did not characterize the grievants= circumstances as compensable under the 
FLSA. In this ALJ=s view, being made whole is receiving one hour of pay for every twelve 
hours of on-call, not time and one-half their hourly pay for every hour outside of regular hours. It 
seems logical that if the FLSA concept oftime and one-half is to be invoked, the FLSA concept 
of on-call should also apply. The grievants do not meet the FLSA on-call standard. 
As set forth above, this ALJ finds he has jurisdiction to address the requested remedy 
back twenty working days from the date the grievance was filed. The Executive Director has the 
discretion to go back one year. Arguments that other periods of limitation should be applied in 
this forum were not persuasive. 
This ALJ recommends the grievants be compensated for on-call time during the twenty 
working day period preceding the filing of their grievance, and prospectively to the extent they 
can establish eligibility for compensation under the legal basis set forth in this Report and 
Recommendation. This ALJ recommends no additional compensation be granted. 
Dated this twenty-second day of May 2000. 
R. Spencer Robinson 
Administrative Law Judge 
Utah Department of Corrections 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Either party may request a meeting with the Executive Director to review this Report and 
Recommendation. The granting of such a review is discretionary, and is not a new hearing. It 
must be requested within five working days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation. 
Executive Director review must be requested in writing. Employee requests constitute a 
written waiver of the time period imposed for the Executive Director to respond at Level4 of the 
grievance process. Requests by the Division Director shall be accompanied by a written waiver 
of the time limits from the employee. 
If review is not requested within five working days of receipt of the Report and 
Recommendation, it will become the Final Order. This Order is final except in the following 
matters: promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, 
violation of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reduction 
in force and disputes concerning abandonment of position. These matters may be appealed to the 
Career Service Review Board by employees dissatisfied with the Department's decision. 
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
Michael 0. Leavitt 6100 South Fash1on Place Boulevard - Su1te 400 
Governor Murray Utah 841 0 7 
H.L. Haun (801) 265-5512 
Executive Director FAX (80 I) 265-5726 
Dan Leatham, Bob Steele, Tim Slocum, 
Bill Johnson, and Fred Hurst, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
Department of Corrections, 
Division ofinstitutional Operations, 
Respondent. 
JAN 2 4 2001 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Final Order 
Case No. 98 HLH 5-G 
Both parties appealed the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge. Former 
Executive Director Haun met with the grievants. On September 6, 2000, Mr. Haun remanded the 
case to Division of Institutional Operations Scott Carver with an invitation to the grievants to 
mediate this matter. 
On January 12, 2001, Mr. Philip Dyer, the attorney for the grievants, sent a facsimile 
transmission to the ALJ. He stated that on behalf of his clients he declined any further efforts to 
mediate the matter and asked the ALJ to refer it to me for a Final Order. 
The grievants' requested remedy is compensation for being on-call, dating four years 
back from the filing of the grievance. They argue that they should receive 1 and V2 times their 
hourly pay for every hour they were on-call. Their argument is based, in part, on Article XVI, 
Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution. They claim that since eight hours constitutes a day's 
work, the carrying of the pager and responding to it when activated constituted work. They also 
seek the multiplier of time and 1/z by drawing on the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
This was not part of the original grievance. They moved to amend the grievance to 
include Article XVI, Section 6. The ALJ rejected the argument, citing R477-1-l (3), which 
defines actual hours worked as, "Time spent performing duties and responsibilities associated 
with the employee's job assignments." It goes on to state that "on-call time" is excluded from 
hours worked. I agree with the ALJ that on-call time, since it is not hours worked, is not part of 
the work day. Therefore, Article XVI, Section 6 is not applicable. 
There is also an issue about the period of limitations applicable in this case. The 
grievants have asserted the period of limitations is four years. I disagree. The applicable period 
is twenty working days from the event or knowledge of it. See 67 -19a-40 1. 
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I accept those findings and conclusions of the ALJ necessary to find that the grievants 
were on-call by virtue ofbeing assigned a commute vehicle, or, in Mr. Slocum's case, by virtue 
of his Post Order. I find there is no excusable neglect justifying the failure to file earlier. I will 
not exercise discretion to go back more than twenty working days from the date the grievance 
was filed. 
Based on that, I order that Mr. Leatham, Mr. Steele, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Hurst, be 
permitted to submit amended time sheets listing on-call time back twenty working days from the 
date they filed their grievances until the time they surrendered their commute vehicles at the end 
of January of 1998. They are to be paid one hour's pay for every twelve hours they were on -call 
during that period of time. 
Mr. Johnson is no longer an employee. Therefore, he cannot be paid from payroll. He 
must be paid through accounts payable. He must sign an agreement accepting responsibility for 
the taxes. 
Mr. Slocum shall also be permitted to submit amended time sheets for the period of 
twenty working days back from February 11, 1998, and prospectively until his Post Order or 
assignment changed, or until he had actual notice his duties as Deputy Warden of Support 
Services no longer included carrying a pager and responding to it on activation, day or night. If 
there is a dispute between Mr. Slocum and the Division ofinstitutional Operations as to when he 
ceased to be eligible for on-call pay based on his Post Order, either party may request a hearing 
before the ALJ. That hearing shall be limited to establishing when his Post Order or assignment 
changed, or when he had actual notice that his duties as Deputy Warden of Support Services no 
longer included carrying a pager and responding to it on activation, day or night. 
Dated this //1 day of--r--fff--'---..:.::_-H-
98 HLH 5-G 
Mike Chabries 
Executive Director 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
If you are dissatisfied, you may appeal this Final Order to the Career Service 
Review Board in accordance with law and the rules of the CSRB. Notice of appeal must be filed 
within ten working days ofreceipt of the Final Order. Failure to file a timely appeal to the 
Career Service Review Board may result in dismissal of the appeal. 
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Exhibit E 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 11. [Courts open- Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an IDJury done 
to hun m ills person, property or reputatJ.on, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, wlllch shall be adrmrustered 
Wlthout derual or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be 
barred from prosecutmg or defenfung before any tnbunal m 
tills State, by hunself or counsel, any CIVll cause to wlllch he 1s 
a parj;y 1896 
Exhibit F 
67-19-3.1 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
67-19-3.1. Principles governing interpretation of chap· 
ter and adopt~on of rules. 
(1) The department shall establish a career service system 
designed in a manner that will provide for the effective 
implementation of the following merit principles: 
(a) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on 
the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and~;kills, 
including open consideration of qualified applicants for 
initial appointment; 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensa-
tion; 
(c) training employees as needed to assure high-quality 
performance; 
(d) retaining empl'oyees on the basis of the adequacy of 
their performance and separating employees whose inad-
equate performance cannot be corrected; ' 
(e) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all 
aspects of personnel administration without regard to 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, political affilia-
tion, age, or disability, and with proper regard for their 
privacy and constitutional rights as citizens; 
(f) providing information to employees regarding their 
political rights and the prohibited practices under the 
Hatch Act; and 
(g) providing a formal. procedure for processing the 
appeals and grievances of employees without discrimina-
tion, coercion, restraint, or reprisal. -
(2) The principles in Subsection (1) shall govern interpre-
tation and implementation ofthi§ chapter. 2000 
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receiving the positive test results or be subJect to further 
disciplinary procedures established by rule of the execu-
tive director in accordance with Section 67-19-34. 1990 
67-19-39. Exemptions. 
Peace officers, as defined under 'Iltle 53, Chapter 13, Peace 
officer Classmcations, acting m their official capacity as peace 
officers in undercover roles and assignments, are exempt from 
t]ie provisions of this act. 2002 
67-19-40. Repealed. 1997 
61-19-41. Cost-Savings Suggestions Pilot Program -
Forms -Application- Evaluation -Awards. 
(1) There is created the Cost-Savmgs Suggestions Pilot 
Program. 
(2) The department shall: 
(a) consult with state agencies to select two to four 
state departments or divisrons to participate in the pilot 
program; 
(b) create a form for an employee to make suggestions 
that will save costs for an employee's agency; and 
(c) distribute the form to the parbcipating state agen-
cies for drstnbution to employees. 
(3) An employee of a participating agency Wlth a cost-
saving suggestion shall: 
(a) complete the form outlining the cost-savmg sugges-
tion; and 
(b) submit it to the employee's agency director and the 
department. 
(4) (a) (i) An agency director who receives a cost-saving 
suggestion from an employee shall, within 30 days, 
evaluate the suggestion to determine if the sugges-
tion is feasrble and might result ~ savings for the 
agency. 
(ii) If the suggestion cannot be adequately evalu-
ated within 30 days, the agency drrector may extend 
the evaluation period for an additional 30 days by 
notifying the employee and the department of the 
extension. 
(b) (i) The department shall submit the suggestion to 
the panel of examiners for the Utah Quahty Servi-ee 
Award Program. 
(ii) The panel of examiners for the Utah Quality 
Service Award Program shall: 
(A) review the suggestion and submit their 
comments to the agency director; 
(B) if the suggestion appears to have applica-
tion to agencies beyond the agency in which the 
suggestion originated, refer the suggestion to 
other agencies to which the suggestion may ap-
ply; and 
(C) approve or deny the suggestions as eligible 
for cost-saving awards as defined in Subsection 
(8). 
(5) After completing the evaluation, the agency director 
shall notify the employee and the department, in writing, that 
the suggestion· 
(a) will be implemented; or 
(b) will not be implemented, wrth a statement explain-
ing why it will not be implemented. 
(6) If the cost-saving suggestion is implemented, the agency 
drrector shall: 
(a) notify the department that the agency Wlll imple-
ment the suggestion; 
(b) provide to the department an estimate of the poten-
tial annual cost savings to the agency; 
(c) give the employee making the suggestion an initial 
cash award of no less than $100 and no more than $200, 
as determined by the agency director; 
(d) forward Information describmg the implemented 
suggestion and the agency's calculation ofthe annual cost 
saving to the Divrsion of Finance; and 
(e) If directed by the Division of Finance, calculate the 
actual annual cost savmg for a period of one year after the 
suggestion has been implemented. 
(7) The Division of Finance shall: 
(a) review and venfy the agency's cost-saving calcula-
tion; and 
(b) report its findings to the department. 
(8) (a) The panel of exammers for the Utah Quality Service 
Award Program in the department shall review the cal-
culated cost savings of the suggestion and the report of 
the Divrsron of Finance and, if appropriate, authorize the 
agency to award 10% of the annual cost savings, not to 
exceed $5,000, to the employee. 
(b) The agency may use the balance of the cost savings 
to enhance programs and not to be used for bonuses, other 
compensation, training, or travel. 
(9) The department and the participating agencies shall 
report to the Govement Operations Interim Committee by 
September 1, 2003, concerning the results of this pilot pro-
gram. 2000 
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PART1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
67-19a-101. Definitions. 
As used m tl:us chapter 
(1) "Admmistrator" means the person employed by the 
board to assist in admimstering personnel policies. 
(2) "Board" means the Career Semce ReVlew _"§oard 
created by tbis chapter. 
(3) "Career service employee" means a person em-
ployed in career semce as defined m Section 67-19-3. 
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all super-
VIsory personnel vested with the authority to implement 
and administer the policieS of the department. 
(5) "Gnevance" means: 
(a) a complamt by a career service employee con-
cerning any matter touchmg upon the relatwnship 
between the employee and his employer; and 
(b) any dispute between a career service employee 
and his employer. 
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an em-
ployee reports and who assigns and oversees the employ-
ee's work. 1991 
PART2 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created -
Members - Appointment - Removal -
Terms - Organization - Per diem and ex-
penses. 
(1) There IS created a Career Service Review Board 
(2) (a) The governor shall appoint five members to the 
board no more than three of which are members of the 
same pohtical party. 
(b) The governor shall appomt members ·whose gender 
and ethmcity represent the career service work force. 
(3) (a) The governor may remove any board member for 
cause. 
(b) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for tbe unex-
pired term. 
( 4) The governor shall ensure that appomtees to the board: 
(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations 
and merit system principles m pubhc employment; and 
(b) are not: 
(i) members of any local, state, or national commit-
tee of a pohtical party; 
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any 
partisan political club; and 
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office. 
(5) (a) Except as reqmred by Subsectwn (b), the governor 
shall appomt board members to serve four-year terms 
beginning January 1. 
(b) Notwithstanding the reqmrements of Subsection 
(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that 
the terms of board members are staggered so that ap-
proximately half of the board is appomted every two 
years. 
(c) The members of the board shall serve until their 
successors are appointed and qualified. 
(6) Each year, the board shall choose a chair and vice chair 
from Its own members. 
(7) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the 
transaction of busmess. 
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is 
present is action of the board. 
(8) (a) Members shall receive no compensatiOn or benefits 
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Fmance 
under Sections 63A-3·106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 1996 
67-19a-202. Powers- Jurisdiction. 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative 
body to review appeals from career service employees and 
agencies of deciswns about promotions, dismissals, demo-
tions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, 
violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equr-
table administration of benefits, reductions in force, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position that have 
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance 
procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide 
any other personnel matters. 
(2) The time hm1ts established in this chapter supersede 
the procedural time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(3) In conjunction with any mquiry, investigation, hearing, 
or other proceedillg, any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other eV1-
dence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 1.991 
67-19a-203. Rulemaking authority. 
The board may make rules governing: 
(1) definitions ofterms, phrases, and words used in the 
grievance process established by this chapter; 
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for pur-
poses of the waiver of time limits established by tlus 
chapter; 
(3) the applicatwn for and service of subpoenas, the 
service and filing ofpleadmgs, and the issuance of rulings, 
orders, determinatwns, summary Judgments, transcripts, 
and other legal documents necessary in grievance pro-
ceedings; 
(4) the use, callmg, attendance, participation, and fees 
of witnesses in gnevance proceedings; 
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings; 
(q)' procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hear-
ings, unless governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the 
Administrative Procedures Act; 
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance 
proceedmgs; and ··~ 
(8) procedures for sealing fries-or makmg data pertain-
ing to a grievance unavailable to the public. 1989 
67-19a-204. Administrator- Powers. 
(1) The governor shall appoint a person With demonstrated 
ability to administer personnel policies to assist the board in 
performing the functions specified in tills chapter 
(2) (a) The administrator may: 
(i) assign qualified, inlpartial hearillg officers on a 
per case basis to adjudicate matters under the juris-
diction of the board; 
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(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evi-
dence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, 
hearing, or other proceeding; and 
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to 
whom the subpoena is directed and upon notice to the 
party who issued the subpoena, quash or modify the 
subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an excessive 
number of w1tnesses, or requests evidence not rel-
evant to any matter in issue. 
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under 
authority of this section, the administrator shall appoint 
hearing officers that have demonstrated by education, 
training, and experience the ability to adjudicate and 
resolve personnel administration disputes by applying 
employee relations principles within a large, public work 
force. 1995 
PART3 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and 
appeals procedure. 
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career 
service employees who are not: 
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work 
force; 
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivi-
sions; 
(c) public employees covered by other grievance proce-
dures; or 
(dj employees of state in~titutions of higher education. 
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an 
employee is qualified to use this grievance procedure, the 
ad)ninistrator shall resolve the question or dispute. The ad-
-rni.riistrator's decision is reviewable only by the Court of 
Appeals. ' 
(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance 
based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, 
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, 
occurrence, omission, or condition for solution through the 
grievance procedures set forth in this chapter. ~991 
67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges sub-
missible under grievance and appeals proce-
dure. 
(1), A career service employee may grieve promotions, dis-
missals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, 
salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the 
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force,, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of 
grievance procedure. 
(2) (a) A career service. employee may grieve au other 
matters only to the level of his department head. 
(b) The decision of the department head is final and 
unappealable to the board. 1991 
67-19a-303. Employees;-fights in grievance and ap-
peals procedu~e. 
(1) For the purpose qf:processing a grievance, a career 
service employee may: 
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employ-
ee's choice to act as an advocate at any level of the 
grievance procedure~ 
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work 
hou;rs_to confer with the representative and prepare the 
grievance; and 
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance 
hearing. 
(2) ':fhe state shall allow employees to attend and testify at 
the gr1evance heanng a~ wime:oses if the employee has given 
reasonable advance notice to his 1nnediate supemsor. 
(3) No person may take an! reprisals against any career 
semce employee for use of gnevance procedures specified in 
this chapter. 
( 4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a 
grievance may not place grievance forms, grievance ma-
terials, correspondence about the grievance, agency and 
department replies to the grievance, or other documents 
relati."J.g to the grievance in the employee's personnel file. 
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a 
grievance may place records of disciplinary action in the 
employee's personnel file. 
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is 
rescinded through th_e grievance procedures established 
in this chapter, the agency and the Department of Human 
Resource Management shall remove the record of the 
disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel 
file and central personnel file. 
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file 
relating to an employee's grievance, but shall discard the 
file after three years. 1991 
PART4 
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY 
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by 
aggrieved employee- Voluntary termination 
of employment - Group grievances. 
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 
3 and the restrictions contained in this part, a career service 
employee may have a grievance addressed by following the 
procedures specified in this part. 
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is 
directed may agree in writing to waive or extend grievance 
steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits specified for those grievance 
steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402. 
' (3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be 
submitted to the administrator. 
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails 
to process the grievance to the next step within the time 
limits established in this part, he has waived his right to 
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the 
grievance. 
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails 
to process the grievance to the next step v;>ithin the time 
limits established in this part, the grievance is considered 
to be settled based on the decision made at the last step. 
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may 
submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if 
the employee submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving 
rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has 
knowledge of the event giving rise to the grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee 
may not submit a gnevance more than one year after the 
event giving rise to the grievance. 
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employ-
ment with the state may not submit a grievance after he has 
terminated his employment. 
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance, 
they may submit a group grievance by following the 
procedures and requirements of this chapter. 
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(b) In subrmttmg a group gr1evance, each aggrieved 
employee shall s1gn the complamt. 
(c) The ad=strator and board may not treat a group 
grievance as a class action, but may select one aggrieved 
employee's grievance and address that grievance as a test 
case. 1999 
67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by ag-
. grieved employee. 
(1) (a) A career semce employee who believes he has a 
grievance shall attempt to resolve the grievance through 
d1scussion Wlth h1s supervisor. 
(b) W1thin :five days after the employee discusses the 
grievance w1th h1m, the employee's supemsor may 1ssue 
a verbal deciswn on the grievance. 
(2) (a) If the grievance remams unanswered for :five work-
ing days after its subm1ssion, or if the aggrieved employee 
is dissatis:fied w1th the supemsor's verbal deciswn, "tile 
employee may resubmit the grievance in wnting to hls 
immediate supervisor Wlthln five working days after the 
exp1rabon of the period for response or receipt of the 
decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five workmg days after the employee's writ-
ten grievance is subnntted, the employee's supervisor 
shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his 
decision and the reasons for the deciswn. 
(c) Immediately after submittmg the written grievance 
to his supemsor, the employee shall notify the adminis-
trator of the board that he has subm1tted the written 
grievance. 
(3) (a) Ifthe written grievance submitted to the employee's 
supervisor remains unanswered for five working days 
after 1ts submission, or if the aggrieved employee is 
dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may 
submit the grievance in writing to hls agency or division 
d1r~ctor within ten working days after the expiration of 
the period for decision or receipt of the decision, which-
ever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's writ-
ten grievance is submitted, the employee's agency or 
division director shall issue a written response to the 
grievance statmg his decision and the reasons for the 
decision. 
(4) (a) If the written gnevance subm1tted to the employee's 
agency or division d1rector remams unanswered for five 
~orking days after 1ts submission, or if the aggrieved 
employee is dissat1sfied with the dec1sion issued, the 
employee may submit the grievance in writing to his 
department head within ten workmg days after the expi-
ratwn of the period for deciswn or rece1pt of the decision, 
wh1chever is :first. 
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's writ-
ten grievance is subnntted, the department head shall 
issue a written response to the grievance stating his 
decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) The dec1sion of the department head 1s final in all 
matters except those matters that the board may review 
under the authonty of Part 3. 
(5) If the wntten grievance submitted to the employee's 
department head meets the subJect matter requirements of 
Section 67-19a-302 and 1f the grievance remains unanswered 
for ten working days after its submisswn, or if the aggrieved 
employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee 
may subm1t the grievance in writing to the admmistrator 
within ten working days after the exp1rabon of the period for 
deciswn or receipt ofthe decision, whichever 1s first. 1991 
67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator - Jurisdictional 
hearing. 
(1) At any time after a career service employee subnnts a 
grievance to the admmistrator under the authority of Section 
67-19a-402, the administrator may attempt to settle the 
grieva.'l.ce lllformally by conference, concli1atwn, and persua. 
s1on with the employee and the agency. 
(2) (a) w'hen an employee subm1ts a grievance to the ad. 
ministrator under the authonty of Section 67-19a-4Q2 
the administrator shall deterrmne. ' 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career S8l:VJ.ce 
employee and is entitled to use the grievance system· 
(1i) whether or not the board has ]Urisd1chon ove; 
the grievance; 
(lii) whether or not the employee has been direct]v 
harmed; and -
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
(b) In order to make the determmations required by 
Subsection (2), the administrator may-
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties 
may present oral arguments, written arguments, or 
both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file. 
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional heanng 
he shall issue hls written dec1sion within 15 days after th~ 
hea.rmg is adjourned. 
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an admin. 
istrative review of the file, he shall issue his written 
decision within 15 days after he receives the grievance 
1991 
67-19a-404. Administrator's responsibilities. 
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets 
the jurisdictional requirements of Part 3, he shall: 
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the com-
plaint; and 
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either: 
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the admin-
istrator issues his decision that the board has Juris-
dlction over the grievance; or 
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the 
administrator. 19B9 
67-19a-405. Prehearing conference. 
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each 
party, the representatives of each party, and other designated 
persons at a prehearing conference '' 
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require th~ 
parties to: 
(a) idenbfy whlch allegatwns are adnutted and which' 
allegations are denied; 
(b) submit a JOint statement detaihng: 
(i) stipulated_ facts that are not in dispute; 
(ii) the 1ssues to be decided; and 
(iii) applicable laws and rules; 
(c) s,ubnnt a list of witnesses, exh1bits, and papers or 
other evidence that each party intends to offer as evi-
dence; and 
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance. 
(3) At ~he conclusion of the prehearmg conference, the 
adm1mstrator may require the parties to prepare a written 
statement idenhfymg: 
(a) the items presented or .agreed to under Subsectwn 
(2); and 
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearmg 
process. 
( 4) The prehearmg conference 1s mfonnal and is not open to 
the public or press. !9B9 
67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by ag-
grieved employee - Hearing before hearing 
officer- Evidentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) (a) The adnunistrator shall employ a certified court 
reporter to record the hearmg and prepare an official 
transcnpt of the heanng. 
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(b) The official transcnpt of the proceedmgs and all 
exillb1ts, bnefs, mobons and pleadmgs received by the 
hearmg officer are the official record of the proceedmg 
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof m all gnevances 
resultmg from d1snnssals, demotwns, suspensions, wnt 
ten repnmands, reductwns m force, and disputes concern 
mg abandonment of pos1hon 
(b) The employee has the burden of proof m all other 
gnevances 
(c) The party Wlth the burden of proof must prove therr 
case by substantial evidence 
(3) (a) The heanng officer shall 1ssue a wntten deciswn 
Wlthm 20 workmg days after the hearmg IS adJourned 
(b) If the heanng officer does not Issue a decision 
Wlthm 20 workmg days, the agency that IS a party to the 
gnevance 1s not hable for any claimed .4ack wages or 
benefits after the date the decision IS due 
( 4) The hearmg officer may 
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to e1ther party, 
(b) close a heanng by complymg w1th the procedures 
and requrrements ofTltle 52, Chapter 4, Open and Pubhc 
Meetmgs, 
(c) seal the file and the ev1dence produced at the 
heanng lithe eVldence rmses questwns about an employ-
ee's character, professwnal competence, or phys1cal or 
mental health, 
(d) grant contmuances accordmg to board rule, and 
(e) dec1de questwns or d1sputes conceDllng standmg m 
accordance w1th Sectwn 67-19a-301 1996 
67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board. 
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the heanng 
officer's dec1s10n on a gnevance to the board If 
(1) the appealmg party files a notlce of appeal w1th 
the adrmmstrator w1thm ten workmg days after the 
rece1pt of the deciswn or the exp1rat10n of the penod 
for declSion, wh1chever IS first, and 
(n) the appeahngparty meets the reqmrements for 
appeal estabhshed ill Subsection (2) 
(b) The appealmg party shall submit a copy of the 
official transcnpt of the hearmg to the admm1strator 
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearmg 
officer's dec1s1on on a gnevance to the board only 1f the 
appeahng party alleges that 
(a) the hearmg officer did not 1ssue a dec1s10n w1thm 20 
workmg days after the heanng adJourned, 
(b) the appealmg party 1s d1ssatls:fied w1th the dec1s1on, 
(c) the appealmg party beheves that the dec1s10n was 
based upon an mcorrect or arb1trary mterpretatwn of the 
facts, or 
(d) the appealmg party beheves that the hearmg officer 
made an erroneous concluswn oflaw 1989 
67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing -
EVIdentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) The board shall 
(a) hold a heanng to reVlew the hearmg officer's deci-
swn not later than 30 days after It receiVes the offic1al 
transcnpt and the bnefs, 
(b) reVlew the dec1s10n of the heanng officer by consld-
enng the offic1al record of that heanng and the bnefs of 
the parties, and 
(c) 1ssue Its wntten deciSIOn addressmg the heanng 
officer's dec1s10n w1thm 40 workmg days after the record 
for 1ts proceedmg 1s closed 
(2) In adilltwn to whatever other remedy the board grants, 
1t may order that the employee be placed on the reappomt-
ment roster prov1ded for by Section 67-19-17 for ass1gnment to 
another agency 
(3) If the board does not Issue Its wntten decision w1thm 40 
workmg days after closmg the record, the agency that 1s a 
party to the gnevance JS not liable for any claimed back wages 
or benefits after the date the deCisiOn 1s due 
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to 
e1ther party 
(5) The board may close a hearmg by complymg With the 
procedures and reqmrements ofTltle 52, Chapter 4, Open and 
Pubhc Meetmgs 
(6) The board may seal the file and the eVIdence produced 
at the hearmg u the evidence raises questwns about an 
employee's character, professiOnal competence, or phys1cal or 
mental health 1996 
CHAPTER 19b 
SUGGESTION AWARDS PROGRAM [REPEALED] 
67-19b-101 to 67-19b-303. Repealed. 
SectiOn 
67-19c-101 
CHAPTER 19c 
EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION 
Department award program 
67-19c-101. Department award program. 
(1) As used m tlns sectwn 
1993 
(a) "Department" means the Department of Adnnms-
tratlve Serv1ces, the Department of Agr1culture and Food, 
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the De-
partment of Commerce, the Department of Commuruty 
and Econonnc Development, the Department of Correc-
tions the Department of Workforce Services, the Depart-
ment of EnVIronmental Quahty, the Department ofFman-
cial Instltutwns, the Department of Health, the 
Department of Human Resource Management, the De-
partment of Human Serv1ces, the Insurance Department, 
the National Guard, the Department of Natural Re-
sources, the Department of Pubhc Safety, the Pubhc 
Service CommisSIOn, the Labor Comrmsswn~ the State 
Board ofEducatwn, the State Board of Regents, the State 
Tax CommJsswn, and the Department of TransportatiOn 
(b) "Departlnent head" means the millVldual or body of 
millviduals m whom the ultimate legal authonty of the 
department Js vested by law 
(2) There IS created a department awards program to 
award an outstandillg employee ill each department of state 
government 
(3) (a) By Apnl 1 of each year, each department head shall 
sohcit nommatwns for outstanding employee of the year 
for lns department from the employees m lns department 
(b) By July 1 of each year, the department head shall 
(I) select a person from the department to receiVe 
the outstandmg employee ofthe year award usmg the 
cntena established m SubsectiOn (c), and 
(n) announce the recipient of the award to lns 
employees 
(c) Department heads shall make the award to a person 
who demonstrates 
(1) extraordmary competence m perfonnmg his 
function, 
(n) creativity m Identuymg problems and devismg 
workable, cost-effective solutions to them, 
(m) excellent relatwnslnps With the pubhc and 
other employees, 
(Iv) a commitment to servmg the pubhc as the 
chent, and 
Exhibit H 
67-19a-202 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
67-19a-202. Powers- Jurisdiction. 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final admimstrat1ve 
body to review appeals from career service employees and 
agencies of decisions about promot10ns, dismissals, demo-
tions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, 
violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equi-
table administration of benefits, reductions in force, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position that have 
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the gnevance 
procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdlction to review or dec1de 
any other personnel matters. 
(2) The,time limits established in this chapter supersede 
the procedural time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, 
or other proceeding, any member of the board may; 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena Wltnesses, documents, and other evi-
dence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 1991 
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67-19a-303. Employees' rights in grievance and ap· 
peals procedure. 
(1) For the purpose of processing a gnevance, a career 
service employee may. 
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employ-
ee's choice to act as an advocate at any level of the 
grievance procedure; 
(b) request a reasonable amount of time dunng work 
hours to confer With the representative and prepare the 
grievance; and 
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance 
hearmg. 
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at 
the grievance hearing as Witnesses if the employee has given 
reasonable advance notice to lns immediate supervisor. 
(3) No person may take any repnsals against any career 
service employee for use of grievance procedures spec1fied in 
this chapter. 
-t4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a 
gnevance may not place gnevance forms, grievance ma-
terials, correspondence about the grievance, agency and 
department replies to the grievance, or other documents 
relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file. 
(b) The employmg agency of an employee who files a 
grievance may place records of disCiplinary action in the 
employee's personnel file. 
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is 
rescinded through the gnevance procedures established 
in this chapter, the agency and the Department of Human 
Resource Management shall remove the record of the 
disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel 
file and central personnel file. 
(d) .A:n. agency may mamtain a separate grievance file 
relating to an employee's gnevance, but shall discard the 
file after three years. 1991 
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PART4 
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY 
AGGRlEVED EMPLOYEE 
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by 
aggrieved employee- Voluntary termination 
of employment- Group grievances. 
(1} SubJect to the standmg requrreroents con tamed m Part 
3 and the restncbons contamed m tills part, a career serv1ce 
employee may have a gnevance addressed by followmg the 
procedures spee1iied m tills part 
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grrevance rs 
drrected may agree m wntmg to warve or extend gnevance 
steps 2, 3, or 4 or the trrne hmrts specriied for those grrevance 
steps, as outlmed m Sectwn 67-19a-402 
"(3) Any wntmg made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be 
subnutted to the adromrstrator 
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, 1fthe employee fa1ls 
to process the gnevance to the next step wrthm the time 
hmrts established m tills part, he has warved hrs nght to 
process the grrevance or to obtam JUdrcral review of the 
gnevance 
(b) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, If the employee farls 
to process the gnevance to the next step withm the bme 
lmnts established m tills part, the gnevance rs considered 
to be settled based on the decisiOn made at the last step 
5) (a) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may 
subrmt a gnevance for revrew under tills chapter only If 
the employee subrmts the gnevance 
(I) wrtilln 20 workmg days after the event grvmg 
nse to the gnevance, or 
(n) wrthm 20 workmg days after the employee has 
knov, ledge of the event grvmg nse to the gnevance 
(b) Notwrthstandmg Subsecbon (5)(a), an employee 
may not subrmt a gnevance more than one year after the 
event grvrng nse to the gnevance 
(6) A person who has voluntanly tennmated ills employ-
ment wrth the state may not sub=t a gnevance after he has 
tennmated ills employment 
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same gnevance 
they may subm1t a group gnevance by followmg the 
procedures and reqmrements of thls chapter 
(b) In sub=ttmg a group gnevance, each aggneved 
employee shall srgn the complamt 
(c) The adm=strator and board may not treat a group 
gnevance as a class acnon, but may select one aggneved 
employee's gnevance a.'l.d address that gnevance as a test 
case 1999 
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Career Service Rev-iew Board 
R137-l-2. Definitions. 
Terms defined in Section 63-46b-2 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) are incorpo-
rated by reference within this rule. ~ addition, other 
terms which are used in this rule are defined below: 
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due dili-
gence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes 
a failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in 
consequence ofthe person's own carelessness, inatten-
tion, or willful disregard m the processing of a griev-
ance, but m consequence of some une:1>:pected or un-
avoidable hmdrance or accident. 
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Department ofHumanResource Management (DHRM) rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i)(ii) 
On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call work 
shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee 
is on-call. 
(i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has freedom of movement 
in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty. 
(ii) Employees record on-call time as "on-call paid" not as "hours worked" on 
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period. Any time actually 
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of 15 minutes as "hours 
worked" in addition to on-call time. 
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